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CERTIORARI: ITS DIAGNOSIS AND CURE
By ROBET W. GrBBs*
A. General Nature and History
Certiorari or a writ of certiorari' is an expression of willingness by the
United States Supreme Court to review a lower court decision. Cases re-
viewable only by certiorari are to be distinguished from appealable cases,
Supreme Court review of which is obligatory.' The bulk of business actu-
ally heard by the Supreme Court comes up on petitions for certiorari.3
Hundreds of these petitions are denied or dismissed each term.4 Needless
to say, an understanding of certiorari is a prerequisite to an understanding
of Supreme Court review.
The institution of discretionary review was largely a response to a con-
tinually overcrowded Supreme Court calendar. As the business of the Court
grew, the review by certiorari steadily displaced appellate review
In 1891, as part of the program establishing the Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals, statutory certiorari was innovated.5 In substance its scope was lim-
ited to patent, revenue and some admiralty cases. The revision of the
Judicial Code in 1911 1 somewhat broadened certiorari to Circuit Courts of
Appeals, by including criminal cases.7 The 1914 amendment" was a land-
land in that it spread certiorari to some review of state decisions: state
decisions favoring the validity of a federal treaty, statute or authority;
* Califorma, A.B. 1950; Harvard Law School, L.L.B., 1953, Law Clerk for Judge William
Healy, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Judicial Circuit 1953-1954; Lieutenant, U.S. Army
Judge Advocate General Corps, 1954-.
11 refer to the statutory writ, not the common law or extraordinary writ of certiorari.
See Wolfson, Extraordinary Writs in the Supreme Court, 51 CoL. L. REv. 977, 984ff (1951). The
Supreme Court is autliorized to issue an extraordinary writ of certioran. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a)
(1946). But it is only used when, though review is desirable, there is no basis for appeal and
the technical prerequisites of statutory certiorari have not been fulfilled. House v. Mayo, 324
U.S. 42, 44ff (1945).
2 It has been suggested that the considerations determining the propriety of an appeal are
much the same as those relevant to whether a petition for certiorari should be granted or
denied. Harper and Pratt, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do, 101 U. op PA. L. REv. 439,
446 (1953). Cf. HAR m WC HSLER, TtEE FEDERAL CouRrs AND =E FEDERAL SYSTEM 574ff
(1953).
3 In the 1952 term the Court reviewed 88 cases brought up on appeal, 36 of which were
not on the merits; while it decided 110 certiorari cases on the merits. The Supreme Court,
1952 Term, 67 HARv. L. REv. 91, 170 (1953).,
4 976 were denied or dismissed last term. Ibid. For past statistics, see the ANNuAL REPORTS
or THE ATTORE=Y-GENEAL.
526 STAT. 828 (1891).
836 STAT. 1087 (1911).
7Id. at 1137.
838 STAT. 790 (1914).
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against the validity of a state statute or authority; or in favor of a federal
title, right, privilege or immunity In 1915' Circuit Court decisions in bank-
ruptcy cases were placed in the certiorari sphere. The Act of September 6,
191610 follower suit by subjecting cases from the Circuit Courts under the
Federal Employers Liability Act, Hours of Service Act and Safety Appli-
ance Act to discretionary review only The same act extended certiorari
review to state decisions holding against the claim of a federal title, right,
privilege or immunity
The great amendment to the Judicial Code in 192 511 collected all of the
previous developments into one Judicial Code. The certiorari review of
state decisions was left essentially the same. But review of Circuit Court
decisions was recategorized, and discretionary review was tremendously
broadened, all Circuit Court decisions became reviewable by certiorari.12
The Act also placed all Court of Claims decisions in the same category 13
The present revision 4 in substance reiterates the 1925 provisions, but
in somewhat more simplified form.
"Sec. 1254. Courts of appeals; certiorari; appeal; certified questions.
Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
by the following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any
civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree;
(2) By appeal by a party relying on a State statute held by a court of
appeals to be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States, but such appeal shall preclude review by writ of certi-
orari at the instance of such appellant, and the review on appeal shall be
restricted to the Federal questions presented;
(3) By certifications
"Sec. 1257 State courts; appeal, certiorari.
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a state in
which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as
follows:
(1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or
statute of the United States and the decision is against its validity
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of
any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties
or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity
(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of
the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a State
statute is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the
9 38 STAT. 804 (1915).
10 39 STAT. 726 (1916).
1143 STAT. 937ff (1925).
12 Id. at 938.
13 Id. at 939.
14 62 STAT. 927ff (1948).
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Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or where any title, right,
privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution,
treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised under
the United States.
The importance of review by certiorari has made great strides over its
sixty year history. But regardless of this span of years, true understanding
of the institution is rare and at best incomplete. In the words of a former
Reporter of the Supreme Court's decisions, "Certiorari is to the. laymen
foolishness and to the lawyers a stumbling block."' 5 Aiding lawyers to re-
main upright in spite of certiorari is a purpose of this paper.
B. Procedure
To comprehend my subsequent analysis, an awareness of certiorari's
procedural framework is essential. Perhaps it would be desirable to exam-
ine briefly the procedural stages of discretionary review
(a) The Petitioner files his petition'8 and transcript of record and pro-
ceedings below. 7 An improvidently taken appeal from a state court de-
cision will be treated as a petition for certiorari;"5 this convenience is not
afforded the appellant from a Court of Appeals decision. 19 Thus, the appel-
lant from the federal court is well advised to file both petitions for appeal
and certiorari simultaneously,2" if there is the slightest doubt of the appeal 2
15 BuTLER, A CExTuRY AT TnE BA or Tm SuPRamm COURT 106 (1952). A neighbor's off-
hand opinion that "certiorari" was the name of a disease suggested the title to this paper.
10 Including a supporting brief is optional.
17 These documents must be filed within ninety days after the judgment or decree below.
62 STAT. 962 (1948), .Revmsed Rules of the Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C.A. Rules 1ff (1950),
(hereafter referred to as "Rules") Rules 38.2 and 38Y2. In criminal cases from Courts of Ap-
peals, the period is only thirty days. FED. R. Cimu. P 37(b) (2) ; Carengella v. U.S., 344 U.S.
881 (1952). The period starts running when the judgment is entered. A second judgment, dif-
ferent in substance than the first, remitiates the period. Department of Banking v. Pink, 317
U.S. 264 (1942), cf. Federal Power Commission v. Idaho Power, 344 U.S. 17 (1952).
A timely motion for rehearing in the court below will toll the period. Gypsy Oil Co. v.
Leo Escoe, 275 U.S. 298 (1927). The deadline may be extended as much as sixty days, with
the permission of a Justice. In Courts of Appeals criminal cases the maximum extension is
thirty days. FED. R. Cpxr. P 37(b) (2). In any case the request for extension must have been
made before the ninety days has expired. Finn v. Railroad Commission, 286 U.S. 559 (1931).
18 62 STAT. 962 (1948), Hopkins Federal Savings and Loan v. Cleary, 295 U.S. 721 (1935)
(appeal dismissed; certiorari granted). It is wase to include reasons why certiorari should be
granted xi the petition for appeal. However, absent such foresight, the Supreme Court will
grant the parties sufficient time to prepare briefs respecting certiorari, when the appeal is dis-
missed. Indian Territory Illuminating Oil v. Board of Education, 287 U.S. 573 (1932).
19 Public Service Commission v. Batesville Telephone, 284 U.S. 6 (1931).
20 See Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368 (1949).
21 Section 1254(2) (see p.2 of text) states, " appeal shall preclude review by writ of
certiorari at instance of such appellant." The 1925 counterpart of this section has been con-
strued to apply only where appeal was properly taken. Bradford Electric Light v. Clapper,
284 U.S. 221, 224 (1931).
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(b) Petitioner requests the court below to stay execution of its judg-
ment. If this request be denied, Petitioner may pray that the Supreme
Court order the court below to desist from enforcing its mandate.'
(c) The Petitioner serves the Respondent with a "notice of filing" and
copies of the petition and supporting brief, subsequently filing a "proof
of service."
(d) The Respondent submits to the Court his brief in opposition and
serves Petitioner with a copy Failure to submit a brief in opposition fre-
quently results in a granting of certiorari, followed by a summary reversal
of the decision below I
(e) The Clerk distributes the filed documents, giving 4 copies to each
Justice.
(f) The Justices separately consider the petition."
(g) The Justices collectively discuss26 and vote on the petition.27 Rare-
ly is the nature of such vote revealed." Traditionally if four Justices are
22 62 STAT. 961 (1948). See Rule 38.6, Magnum Import v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 164 (1923).
The petition must show that certiorari is likely to be granted and that convenience requires
such relief.
23 Thibaut v. Car & General Insurance, 332 U.S. 751 (1947), ROBERTSON AND KiRKHrAI,
JURISDICTION OF THE SuPREmE COURT 600 (Wolfson and Kurland ed. 1951).
24 If the petition and record is in forma paupers, such distribution can not thus occur.
The usual procedure is for the Clerk to submit the documents to the Chief Justice. Stone,
Functions of the Circuit Conference, 28 A.B.A.J. 519 (1942), Robertson and Kirkham, supra
note 23. The Chief Justice then makes a memorandum, which is circulated among the Justices.
Occasionally the documents actually submitted accompany this memorandum. Chief Justice
Stone's protest to the granting of certiorari in Bailey v. Central Vermont RR, 319 U.S. 350,
359 (1943) demonstrates that the Chief Justice's memorandum is not necessarily decisive.
25 See Furness, Withy & Co. v. Yang Tsze Insurance, 242 U.S. 430, 434 (1917). Though
this case was decided thirty-five years ago, it retains enough vitality to be cited in Rule 38.2.
Also see Stone, Functions of the Circuit Conference, supra note 24.
26 Rarely is there oral argument on the petition, although occasionally the Court issues
an order to show cause why the petition should be denied or granted. STERn Am GRESsrAN,
SuPREmm COURT PRACTICE 128 (1950). See Taft, Jurtsdiction of the Supreme Court, 35 YALE
L.. 1, 12 (1925).
27 Under Hughes, the following procedure occurred in conference: the Chief Justice stated
the case, the Justices in order of seniority voiced their opinions, and the Justices in reverse
order of seniority cast their votes. On an average, three and one-half minutes were required
to dispose of each petition. McElwain, Business of the Supreme Court, 63 HARV. L. REv. 5, 14
(1949).
28 See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 67 (1949). Though some of the Justices occa-
sionally reveal their vote through recorded dissents or in the opinion on the merits, any state-
ment by one or more Justices objecting to a denial of certiorari is said not to indicate that such
Justices were the only ones that unsuccessfully supported the petition. Chemical Bank & Trust
v. Group of Institutional Investors, 343 U.S. 982 (1952).
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in favor of granting the petition, a writ will issue.2 Occasionally the "rule
of four" is relaxed; and an affirmative vote of three Justices will lead to a
granting of certiorari 0
(h) The Clerk notifies counsel of record and the court below of the
petition's disposition.
(i) If certiorari was denied, Petitioner may petition for rehearing. The
petition for rehearing usually stresses new developments, curing of juris-
dictional defectss' or new arguments. Respondent may file a brief in oppo-
sition. The Justices then reaffirm or reverse the prior ruling.32
If the petition was granted, Respondent may make a motion to dismiss
the writ of certiorari. Petitioner may then file a brief in opposition to the
motion. The Justices either reject the motion, or dismiss the writ as having
been improvidently granted. 3 Apparently a vote of five Justices is all that
is necessary to dismiss the writ.?' That five Justices can cause a writ to be
dismissed, which they alone could not cause to be denied, seems quite
anomolous.35 Justice Douglas suggests that, for the "rule of four" to re-
tain its vitality, when none of the Justices who favored granting of the writ
would support dismissal, the other Justices should desist from voting for
dismissal.38
C. Problem: The Why and Wherefore of a Successful Petition
The mental processes of the Justices, when they consider these peti-
2 Hearings before Committee on Judicuary on S.2176, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 9ff (1935),
Bailey v. Central Vermont RR, 319 U.S. 350, 359 (1943). This departure from the usual ma-
jority rule was adopted to assure the review of worthy cases, which a cursory examination
of the petition might unwittingly fail to uncover. Burton, .Judging Is Also Administration,
21 TEiupm L.Q. 77, 84 (1947).
30 Hearings, supra note 29, at 9. But apparently this is not always true. United Mine Work-
ers v. U.S., cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949) (Black, Reed and Douglas dissenting).
3 1 The Court may deny certiorari because of a jurisdictional defect, and then subsequently
grant review on a petition for rehearing, because the defect has been cured. Jones v. Opelika,
cert. granted, 314 U.S. 593 (1941), dismissed, 315 U.S. 782 (1942) (certiorari dismissed for
want of final judgment), cert. granted, 316 U.S. 584, 588 (1942) (on petition for rehearing),
because a final judgment had been obtained, 242 Ala. 549, 7 So.2d 503 (1942). Though the
petitioner may be able to cure them, he should still dispell all doubts of jurisdictional defects
in the original petition; otherwise he is risking a demal of the petition with no indication of the
operative jurisdictional defect that can be cured.
3 2 Occasionally the Court sua sponte vacates a denial of certiorari. U.S. ex rel. Eichenlaub
v. Watkins, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867, cert. denial vacated, 337 U.S. 955 (1949).
n The Court dismisses s-ua sponte considerably more frequently than it vacates denials
sua sponte.
3 4 Hammerstein v. Superior Court, 341 U.S. 491 (1951).
3 5 It is puzzling why the "rule of four" does not also apply to dismissals of the writ.
Perhaps the Court feels that since dismissals of certiorari come only after considerable delib-
eration on the case, there is no reason to discard the usual rule of the majority. See note 29.
S6 U.S. v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288, 298 (1952).
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tions, is the topic of immediate concern. Within the confines of his own
chamber, of what is each Justice thinking when he evaluates the petition?
What are the controlling factors determimng the success or failure of the
petition when it is briefly considered by all of the Justices jointly?
The problem is an important one. Recognition of the controlling con-
siderations could and would have significant effects on the United States
Supreme Court bar. Awareness of the factors that are considered would
enable practitioners before the Supreme Court to argue more efficiently
and persuasively that certiorari should be granted or that it should be de-
nied in a specific case. A better understanding of certiorari well may result
in the withholding of nonmeritorious petitions. 7 And finally if the views
of the Justices on the merits of a decision below are critical in a substantial
number of certiorari denials, denials of certiorari might be entitled to some
effect as case precedent.
D. Source Materials and the "'Doctrine of Secrecy"
Through a number of different media the United States Supreme Court,
from time to time, has made statements of general considerations relevant
to rulings on certiorari petitions. The most easily obtainable of these state-
ments is found in the Revised Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 38.5 (a)
and (b)
"A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion, and will be granted only where there are special and
important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor
fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons
which will be considered:
(a) Where a state court has decided a federal question of substance not
theretofore determined by this court, or has decided it in a way probably
not in accord with applicable decisions of this court.
37The filing of nonmeritonous petitions has plagued the Court for years. SEN-. REP. No.
711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1937) (letter from Chief Justice Hughes to Senator Wheeler),
20 A.B.A.J. 341 (1934) (Hughes' address to American Law Institute). Whether a better ap-
preciation of relevant considerations would result in the filing of fewer unworthy petitions
may be subject to some doubt. FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT
257ff (1928). Assuming enough transcripts of the record have been printed, the comparatively
small expense involved for filing a petition is not prohibitive.
However, the threat of censure by the Supreme Court for a frivolous or poorly executed
petition provides some tempering influence. See Taft, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
35 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1925). An additional coercive measure is the threat of penalty akin to that
for frivolous appeal;. See Rule 30.2, Frankfurter and Hart, Business of the Supreme Court,
51 HARv. L. REv. 577, 594 (1938). Moreover, in view of the added expense and counsel fees
incurred by the petitioner and the burden on the Supreme Court, it is felt that the counsel for
the petitioner is morally obliged to file only petitions having at least a reasonable chance of
success. Taft, supra, at 3. Some optimism has been expressed that an educated bar in time may
withhold nonmeritonous petitions spontaneously. Frankfurter and Landis, supra, at 289.
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(b) Where a circuit court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict
with the decision of another circuit court of appeals on the same matter;
(2) or has decided an important question of local law in a way probably
in conflict with applicable local decisions; (3) or has decided an important
question of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by this
court; (4) or has decided a federal question in a way probably in conflict
with applicable decisions of this court; (5) or has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such
a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this court's power
of supervision.
In appraising a specific case, these general considerations are not too
helpful. s The following uncertain and flexible terms detract from the in-
formative value of Rule 38.5: "sound judicial discretion," "special and
important reasons," "probably in conflict," "important question" and "ac-
cepted and usual course of judicial proceedings." The second sentence of
the Rule puts the reader on notice that the Supreme Court reserves the
right either not to hold as controlling or to discard completely the factors
stated in the Rule. 9
The second major source of general considerations requires an exam-
ination of the legislative history of the statutory writ of certiorari. The two
important dates to remember are 1891 and 1925. In conducting hearings
and debates respecting the pertinent bills prior to their becoming law, Con-
gress might have provided some insight. But the attitudes of the Fifty-First
and Sixty-Eighth Congresses would tend to discount any such optimism.
The pioneering legislators of the nineties were too preoccupied in innovat-
ing a whole new system to spend much time on the administrative details
of certiorari, which was only one point in a larger program to ease the
Supreme Court's burden.40 But the statesmen of 1924 and 1925 were aware
of and were curious respecting the factors that the Court does actually
consider. However, this curiosity was shortlived; apparently the 1925 Con-
88 Cf. "Rule 35 (the forerunner of Rule 38.5) indicates with great clarity the character of
'special and important reasons' by which the 'sound judicial discretion' of the court will be
guided." Fi iA, URTR AND LANmis, Busirass op T SuPnm CouRT 287 (1928). At least
one of the authors retrenched within six or seven years. "In the absence of detailed, rnforming
studies of certiorari, such rules together with the Court's own infrequent explanations of its
policy constituted inexpert counsel's sole reliance. Judged by such standard, it may be ques-
tioned whether Rule 38 which governs petitions for certiorari is as explicit as it might be ... ?I
Frankfurter and Hart, Business of the Supreme Court, 48 HAuv. L. REv. 238, 264 (1934). Also
see Harper and Pratt, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do, 101 U. or PA. L. Rlv. 439, 440
(1953).
39 The Court seems to be giving less attention to the factors specified in Rule 38.5(b) and
greater application to this admonition. Frank, The United States Supreme Court, 17 U. oF CHI.
L.R av. 1, 36 (1949).
4 0 Debate only on general principles was lengthy and thorough. See the various recorded
debates on H.R. 9014 in 21 and 22 CONG. Rac. (1890-91).
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gress was awestricken by the triumvirate of VanDevanter, McReynolds
and Taft." Nevertheless, various Congressional discussions pertaining to
these two major acts, and others, do provide some information. Also, the
very nature of various bills since 1891, both successful and unsuccessful,
provide other clues.
Another important source might be labelled "official statements by the
Justices." These appear in a number of forms, all of which are present in
the various reports of the United States Supreme Court. cases. Occasion-
ally there are memoranda appended to a series of reported rulings on ap-
plications for certiorari. Once in a while, either a memorandum or a dis-
senting opinion has actually accompanied a denial of certiorari. At times
lengthly discussions of the problem will appear in an opinion on the merits,
but usually the Court will merely include a brief explanation of why cer-
tiorari has been granted. I have categorized these official statements as
statements of general considerations. This may seem somewhat enigmatic,
especially my inclusion of explanations why review was granted or denied
in particular cases. Because of the brevity of this type of statement' and
the usual absence of any effort to relate it to the facts of the pertinent case,
I consider my categorization sound. The general nature of the other official
statements also leads to the same treatment.
The final source of general considerations may be called "informal
statements of by the Justices." These informal statements may be found
in testimony before Congressional committees, addresses before bar asso-
ciations and various periodicals. Seldom do the Justices ever advert to
specific cases in these informal statements.
Are these statements of general considerations sufficient to inform the
Supreme Court bar of the types of arguments their petitions and briefs in
opposition should contain? Undoubtedly they are of some help. But the
stock-in-trade of the American lawyer has traditionally been cases, not
broad legal principles. The lawyer's art depends largely upon arguing
from cases, which are specific applications of general principles. Consistent
In the Senate hearings the question was raised whether Congress should supply standards
upon which the justices must base their rulings on certiorari. Mr. Justice Van Devanter, in
opposing this suggestion, said, "When I speak of a discretionary jurisdiction on certiorari I do
not mean, of course, that the Supreme Court merely exercises a choice or will in granting or
refusing the writ, but that it exercises a sound judicial discretion (emphasis added), gives care-
ful thought to the matter in the light of the supporting and opposing briefs, and resolves it
according to recognized principles." (Emphasis added.) With this conclusion, Van Devanter
rapidly changed the subject. He was never again pressed to reveal in more detail the nature
of what he called, "sound judicial discretion" and "recognized principles." Hearings before
Judiciary Committee on S.2060, 68th Cong., 1st Seas. 30 (1924).
42 "The cases are here on petition for writs of certiorari which we granted because of the
importance of the questions presented." Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 177 (1947).
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with this facet of our adversary system, the practitioner before the Supreme
Court requires more specific information.
Statements of considerations specific to particular cases are quite rare.
Seldom do the Justices, in a decision on the merits of a case, spell out with
sufficient detail the reasons for having granted certiorari. Almost without
exception informative explanations of certiorari denials are not published.
This calculated taciturnity I have chosen to label the "doctrine of secrecy."
Various members of the Supreme Court have quite candidly verified the
existence of the doctrine.4 And members of the bar seem to accept it
45
though on occasion it has been subjected to merciless attack.4 6 The Jus-
tices, however, are reluctant to support the policy with reasons. It cannot
be accepted that they have no articulable reasons for their respective
votes.41 Some suggest that the "doctrine of secrecy" is an effort to create
an air of mystery around the Court, the theory being that mystery is con-
ducive to dignity 49 Equally illusory is a reason offered by the Court itself,
that secrecy is justifiable since in a particular case a number of Justices
are likely to have different reasons for voting as they did.g0 Although I
question the harmfulness of publicizing such differences among the Jus-
tices,51 no such objection would be apropos if only one consideration were
43 ;) and no general classification of cases can hope to forecast the specific instances
deserving the Court's ultimate judgment?' Frankfurter and Hart, Busness of the Supreme
Court, 48 HAR. L. REv. 238, 275 (1934).
44 Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950).
45 Hearzngs before Judicury Committee on S.1392, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1944 (1937).
Also see Boskey, Mechanics of the Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction, 46 CoL. L. Rv. 254,
259ff (1946).
46 On the Senate floor Senator McKeller said the following: "No one except the members
of the Court knows exactly how these certiorari cases are considered. Their proper disposition
being challenged by the President of the United States, and the Court deeming it proper to
make reply thereto, why did not the learned Chief Justice give the exact method of the Court
in dealing with these cases? . . For some reason he does not choose to do so
"The secret is still with the Court It is seemingly carefully guarded from the rude
gaze of the President and of the Congress and of the public. Why this secrecy m a court of
justice?" 81 CONG. REc. 2810ff (1937).
47 Some have even recognized the importance of certainty m this branch of review pro-
cedure. "The Court is keenly alive to the importance of having its discretionary reviewing power
exercised by the application of well-defined legal criteria." Frankfurter and Landis, supra
note 35, at 287.
48 Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 489 (1953) ("But we know best how puzzling it often
would be to state why the Court denied certiorari even when we are parties to the demal.")
49 See the testimony of John P Devaney, President of the National Lawyers Guild, re-
specting the "reorganization bill." Hearings, supra note 45, at 68.
0 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 227 (1950).
51 Some commentators advocate the abandoning of the doctrine of secrecy, m order to
obtain the "benefits" of public surveillance of the Justices' reasoning underlying certiorari
denials. Harper and Pratt, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do, 101 U. oz PA. L. Rav. 439,
442 (1953).
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expressed in any given case. 5'
Another indefensible explanation 53 is that a contrary policy would sub-
ject the Supreme Court to hard and fast rules of when review should be
accepted. It is claimed that this condition would defeat the very purpose
of statutory certiorari, to confer upon the Court the power to control the
number of cases it is to hear. But the policy of stare decisis is no stronger
than the Court itself makes it. If the United States Supreme Court should
receive a petition for certiorari respecting a case, which previously ex-
pressed considerations indicate should be granted, the Court has three al-
ternatives. It may of course grant the petition. If there is a previously
unarticulated consideration which renders the granting of certiorari inad-
visable, a denial of the petition may be justified by distinguishing the pres-
ent case from the earlier cases. The distinguishing scheme, not a direct
rejection of stare decisis, is not uncommon to the Supreme Court. However,
if there is no prospect of distinction, and six Justices still think the petition
should be denied, stare decisis may have to be circumvented, ' as has occa-
sionally been done in the past.55
More serious reasons have been suggested. The Court will never forget
the 1937 campaign to reorganize. It is conceded by most that the lag be-
tween the legal philosophies of a number of Justices of the Hughes' Court
and the publicly endorsed New Deal provided the impetus for the packing
attempt. The Justices probably now feel that the inclusion of opinions as
to why certiorari was accepted or denied would again place them in the
political arena.5 6 Thus, if "importance" is a controlling factor, a Supreme
Court finding of nonimportance could be a new basis for anti-Supreme
Court sentiment. If the Court considered a case not "ripe" for a most effec-
tive decision, again it may be subjected to public rebuke. In reply to this
fear, I submit that rulings respecting certiorari petitions which might thus
prove embarrassing should be issued without opinion. That the conspicu-
ous absence of opinion, among all the other opinions on certiorari petitions,
would heighten such embarrassment is a fair rejoinder. However, as I shall
exposit later, only a few of these opinions could be written per term, even
if the doctrine of secrecy were completely rejected. The fear of conspicu-
ousness drops out, the Supreme Court being subject to no more embarrass-
52 Which consideration should actually be reported will be considered below. See note 57
znfra.
53 BUTLER, A CENTURY AT THE BAR OF THE SUPREME COURT 109 (1942).
54 If the otherwise meritorious petition must be denied because the docket happens to be
overcrowded with worthier cases, a notation to that effect would even avoid a rejection of
stare decisis.
55 Douglas, Stare Decas, 49 COL. L. REv. 735 (1949).
56 Harper and Pratt, supra note 51, at 444.
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ment for any particular ruling on certiorari without opinion, than it now
is under the doctrine of secrecy.
Time consumption often has been offered in support of the doctrine of
secrecy. Certainly if the Court were to write a detailed opinion respecting
each petition, its work would never be done. The time consumption argu-
ment is less persuasive if the Court were to issue such opinions only in
selected cases.57 But a selective practice would still consume extra time,
thereby diminishing the number of cases that the Court could hear on the
merits, assuming that the workload otherwise would remain constant. How-
ever, the workload would not otherwise remain constant. In the past two
decades the Justices have made both formal and informal statements that
a great percentage of the petitions for certiorari are improvidently filed.58
Since the appellate opinion has always been the tree from which the Ameri-
can lawyer picks his fruit, its absence from the field of certiorari would
account for many of the ill advised petitions. Thus, even with a selective
discarding of the doctrine of secrecy, it is my contention that the number
of unworthy petitions for certiorari would thin out.59 The end result would
be a decrease in the number of petitions filed, accompanied by some in-
crease in the opinion writing workload.
The repercussions of the doctrine of secrecy are quite obvious.6° I have
already mentioned the excessive number of patently unworthy petitions for
certiorari that annually come to the Supreme Court. Another consequence
is that the draftsman is ill equipped to produce the most convincing peti-
tion or opposing brief. Undoubtedly more skillful arguments would have
led the Court to grant certiorari in some cases that they otherwise had
denied, and vice versa.
Fortunately there have been some departures from the doctrine, some
of which are more apparent than others. A few opinions on the merits have
included sufficiently detailed statements of why certiorari was granted to
amount to statements of specific considerations. More frequently, specific
considerations are revealed in opinions accompanying decisions dismissing
57 Conceivably opinions could be written on cases selected at random. "Of far greater
value would be the occasional full opinions upon demal of petitions, where explanation of
reasons for demal would illuminate large numbers of cases." Frankfurter and Hart, Business
of the Supreme Court, 48 HARv. L. Rav. 238, 275 (1934). Another sound standard of selection
would be to seek out demals of certiorari most clearly demonstrating significant factors, par-
ticularly those denials raising considerations not previously articulated to the bar.
58 See note 37 supra.
59 Harper and Pratt, supra note 51, at 443.
60 Even justice Jackson, then Assistant Attorney-General, conceded that he was totally
unaware of the reasons for the Court's denials of certiorari in a large number of his own cases.
Hearings, supra note 51, at 59ff.
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writs for having been improvidently grantedY' In recent years several dis-
sents to denials with dissenting opinions recorded have given some infor-
mation. These express departures from the doctrine of secrecy have dwelled
on the obvious considerations-e.g., conventional jurisdictional defects,
cases of extreme national importance, etc. The less apparent departures are
more fruitful, but the tediousness and uncertainty accompanying them
minimize their analytical value.2 By "less apparent departures," I mean
conclusions that can be deduced from various comparative studies of cases
-e.g., dissents to certiorari denials recorded with or without opinions,
compared to voting disposition on the same cases after the petition for cer-
tiorari was granted on rehearing; recorded dissents to denials, compared
to how the dissenting Justices vote on cases with similar issues that are
reviewed by the Codrt on the merits, etc.
Perhaps the continued presence of these frugal departures from term
to term may indicate that the doctrine of secrecy is waning. I am not con-
vinced, however, that any such trend has commenced. At the present time,
the doctrine of secrecy is in full bloom. Because of this handicap, the task
of the analyst of certioraxi is of course a difficult one; hence, many of the
cases cited in the ensuing discussion are merely illustrative of probable
applications of certain principles, certainty of application being unascer-
tainable.
E. Formal Factors
The factors considered by the Supreme Court generally fall into four
categories: formal, jurisdictional, tactical and substantive. The Court is
considerably more liberal in disclosing factors falling within the first two
categories. The tactical factors, though understandable when known, are
somewhat difficult of ascertainment. But the fourth class, as my analysis
will show, presents the greatest difficulties, both in ascertainability and
understandability
61 Propositions relating to dismissals of certiorari must be regarded with special care. In
the interest of producing something for the time spent, the later in the proceeding the improvi-
dence is discovered, the less likely is a dismssal of the writ to follow. At one time this observa-
tion would have been dubious. Layne & Bowler v Western Well Works, 261 U.S. 387, 393
1923) (Taft, C.J.). But apparently the principle laid down by Chief Justice Taft no longer
has its original vitality Notwithstanding reference by Justices Frankfurter and Rutledge to
the language in the Layne & Bowler case, the Court decided on the merits in Stinback v. Mo
Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 384ff (1949), but cf. N.L.R.B. v Mexia Textile Mills, 339 U.S.
563, 573 (1950).
Hence, some dismissals on these grounds may be regarded as a fortiori cases for simple
denials of certiorari. And an opimon, dissenting to a decision on the merits, claiming that cer-
tiorai should be dismissed, may be regarded as manifesting controling considerations, were
the pertinent factors evident when the petition was voted upon.
62 Stern, Dental of Certiorarz Despite a Conflict, 66 HARv. L. REv. 465, 466 n.3 (1953).
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There are two general types of formal requirements. The first might
well be called "clerical-technical requirements." They are the type clearly
specified in the Rules of the Supreme Court, non-compliance with which
will result in a refusal to process the appropriate documents. Thus, the
Clerk may refuse to accept the petition, if all the necessary documents are
not filed, or the required number of copies are not submitted. 3 The Clerk
may reject documents, if they are not the correct size or do not contain the
proper print. Failure to comply with the appropriate time limits will also
prove fatal.0 4
The other type of formal requirements is applied by the Justices them-
selves, when they consider the petition. Some of these requirements are
expressed in the Rules; others are not. 5 But they all have one central
theme: the saving of time. If the petition is drafted in a manner that de-
mands unnecessary time consumption by the reader, it might well be
denied.'
If the petition is of unreasonable length, the tired eyes of the Justices
may compel denial of certiorari. The denial in the Alabama Marble case6"
seems to be illustrative of the formal requirement of brevity. The petition
for certiorari was only about thirty-five pages long. But the proportionate
allocation of pages to the various components of the petition seemed quite
imprudent. 9 Twenty-two pages were devoted to the statement of a basi-
cally simple fact situation. Eight more pages contained some thirty "ques-
tions presented." 70 Only in the last few pages of the petition was mention
63 Rule 38.2 requires forty copies of the petition. Rule 38.3 demands the filing of proof
of service. Rules 38.1 and 38.7 require ten transcripts of the record and proceedings below to
accompany the petition, with thirty more to follow if the petition is granted.
64 United States ex rel. Schirrmeister v. Watkins, 337 U.S. 942 (1949).
65 See Furness, Withy & Co. v. Yang-Tsze Insurance Ass'n, 242 U.S. 430 (1917). This case,
involving a dismissal of certiorari improvidently granted, is recognized as the classic statement
of the various formal requirements utilized by the Justices.
66Frequently a word of advice from the Clerk, before the petition is printed in final form,
helps the petitioner avoid the drastic effect of many formal defects.
OTAlabama Marble v. N.L.R.B., cert. dened, 342 U.S. 823 (1951). The case involved
whether an employer, on reinstating employees who had participated m an unjustified strike,
must verbally reserve the right to discharge the ringleaders, in order to be privileged to dis-
charge them for such activity after a subsequent investigation. The court below had held that
the employer must go through this verbal formula. 185 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1951).
68 Thirty-five pages does not seem per se excessively long. However, the Solicitor General's
Office tries never to go beyond twenty-five pages, and preferably never more than fifteen.
WIENER, E CTIVE APPELATE ADvocAcy 240 (1950).
69 The Government felt that this condition of the petition was worthy of mention. Brief
in Opposition, p. 1128, supra note 67.
70 Some of the questions were repetitive; many others were exclusively questions of fact.
Certiorari was expressly denied for similar defects in Tiger v. Lozier, 275 U.S. 496 (1927).
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made of the reasons why it should be granted.7 The petition's defects are
brought into bold relief when it is compared to the brief in opposition.
72
Clarity and organization is another formal requirement.73 Perhaps the
denial of certiorari in Alabama Marble is indicative of this requirement as
well. A petition incomplete is content74 is also likely to be unsuccessful.
F. Jurisdictional Factors
It is not within the purpose of this paper to examine in any detail the
jurisdictional prerequisites to Supreme Court review of state and lower
federal court decisions.75 Suffice it to say that petitions have been demed
for lack of final judgment; 76 judgment not of the highest available state
court; 77 mootness; 71 federal question improperly raised, 79 adequate non-
federal ground;80 want of a substantial federal questions' and failure to
exhaust remedies.82
71 The statement of reasons in substance contained only several naked assertions, accom-
panied by a rather lengthy list of case citations, which were purportedly in conflict with the
decision below.
72 Seven page statement of facts; two questions presented, and seven pages of argument
against granting of the petition.
73 See Erie RR Co. v. Kirkendall, 266 U.S. 185 (1924).
74 Rule 38.2 contains a quite clear statement of the indispensable contents of a petition:
statement of the "matter involved" (i.e., statements of facts and proceedings below) , juris-
dictional statement (See Rule 12.1) , questions presented, and reasons for granting the petition.
The same rule specially warns that "A failure to comply with these requirements will be
a sufficient reason for denying the petition."
75 1 do not refer to defects going to the jurisdiction of the court below. For purposes of
determining whether certiorari will be granted, this type of jurisdictional question, see Indian-
apolis v Chase National Bank, 314 U.S. 63 (1941) (cert. granted to decide diversity of citizen-
ship issue) Rather I refer to instances where the lower courts had jurisdiction, but the United
States Supreme Court does not.
76 Avance v. Thompson, 323 U.S. 753 (1944).
77 Hammerstein v Superior Court of California, 340 U.S. 919 (1951).
78 Parisi v. New York, 323 U.S. 753 (1944). Generally if the defect in the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction is indicative of a like defect in the jurisdiction of the court below, the Court will
grant certiorari and order the judgment vacated, in order not to subject the defendant below
to a void judgment or the plaintiff to res judicata. Thus, in moot cases the Supreme Court
usually grants certiorari and vacates the judgment; but, if the case involves habeas corpus
and the petitioner has been released, certiorari will probably be denied. Boskey, Mechanics
of the Supreme Court's Certiorart Jurisdiction, 46 COL. L. REv. 254, 265 (1946).
7 9 Missouri Pacific RR v. Hanna, 266 U.S. 184 (1924) (certiorari dismissed).
80 Stembridge v. Georgia, 343 U.S. 541 (1952) (cert. dismissed). Moreover, the Court has
denied certiorari because it was unable to tell whether or not there was an adequate non-federal
ground. Public Service Commission v. Wisconsin Telephone, 309 U.S. 657 (1940). On the other
hand, it has continued cases to permit the state court to express whether or not an adequate
state ground was present. Hammerstein v. Superior Court, 340 U.S. 622 (1951).
81 La Plain v. Allard, 280 U.S. 527 (1929).
82 Osment v. Pitcairn, 317 U.S. 587 (1942).
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Undoubtedly petitions have been denied for failure to fulfill those stat-
utory conditions defining the very scope of certiorari review jurisdiction.83
But a petition will not be denied, merely because appeal could have been
obtained. The Act of 1925 expressly negated such a possibility respecting
a petition for certiorari to a state court." Though an express provision was
not included respecting certiorari to Circuit Courts of Appeals, a similar
principle is implied by the language in the statute."
5
G. Tactical Factors
The third category does however bear some deliberation. What are the
tactical prerequisites to granting certiorari? None can doubt that tactical
factors are considered by the Justices."8 The importances 7 of this type of
consideration is both understandable and justifiable; but the ascertain-
ment of its significance, if any, in past denials of certiorari is a painful
task. Generally tactical denials fall within either of two classes: the sin-
83 Ordinarily a federal district court decision is never reviewable by the Supreme Court
on certiorari. But certiorari may be granted to review a federal distict court decision, if it is
appealable to a court of appeals. 62 STAT. 961 (1948), Rule 39. An appeal must have been taken
to the Court of Appeals, even though judgment need not have been entered. The infrequent
application of Rule 39 is generally justified because of the national interest in an immediate
and authoritative final decision by the highest court of the land. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). But the Supreme Court may apply Rule 39 as a timesaving
device, though there is no urgency to decide the case. For example, the Supreme Court, after
having, heard a lengthy argument on the merits followed by a dismissal of the appeal, granted
the simultaneously filed petition for certiorari and decided on the merits. Stamback v. Mo Hock
Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 380 (1949). Generally, however, the Court favors waiting for an
reformative Court of Appeals decision, especially if a question of state law is involved.
84 See 43 STAT. 937 § 237(b) (1925).
85 Section 1254(1) authorizes certiorari in "any civil or criminal case." (Emphasis added.)
The same section also states when certiorari to a Circuit Court of Appeals is barred, thereby
implying no other instances where discretionary review is not available.
8 6 "Petitions may have been demed because, even though serious constitutional questions
were raised, it seemed to at least six members of the Court that the issue was either not ripe,
or too moribund for adjudication; that the question had better await the perspective of time
or that time would soon bury the question or, for one reason or another, it was desirable to
wait and see; or that the constitutional issue was entangled with nonconstitutional issues that
raised doubt whether the constitutional issue could be effectively isolated; or for various other
reasons not relating to the merits." Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 227 (1950).
87 Perhaps the Justices minimrie the import of tactical considerations, depending upon the
severity of leaving the decision below as is. Thus, assuming that all other prerequisites for
granting certiorari are fulfilled, tactical defects might well be ignored, if otherwise the peti-
tioner would be electrocuted. But cf. Rosenberg v. U.S., cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838; petition for
rehearing denied, 344 U.S. 889 (1952).
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gular peculiarities of the cases render review inadvisable or the time is
inopportune to review the issue."
The Court is reluctant to grant certiorari when its likely holding
8 9
would be subject to excessively broad interpretation. Thus, if the likely
holding in the Baltimore Radio Show case"0 was an affirmance of the Mary-
land Court of Appeals, fear that it would be interpreted as license for the
various organs of public expression to impede the administration of justice
would have been well founded. On the other hand, the Court might have
feared that an affirmance would be too narrowly interpreted.' The peculiar
facts of the case revealed that the defendant in the criminal proceeding,
the administration of which the Radio Show purportedly disrupted 2 prob-
ably would not have chosen a trial by jury;oa moreover, that defendant
could have made a motion to change venue; and finally any jury would
probably have been incensed, notwithstanding the radio announcements.
The Supreme Court might well have wished to uphold freedom of commu-
mcation, but feared that a holding for acquittal would be too easily distin-
guishable, because of the case's extenuating circumstances. It might be
argued that the Supreme Court in its opinion on the merits could have
avoided subsequent misinterpretation by spelling out its reasoning and
holding. But such a technique is usually to no avail. Lawyers have a way
of getting around such language. Cases, as precedent, are generally judged
on the basis of what the court did, not what it said.
If the "statement of the matter involved"94 reveals that Supreme Court
review of issues, that would otherwise justify a granting, could be avoided
8 8 There may be a few miscellaneous tactical considerations, but seldom could they be con-
trolling. Justices might be reluctant to grant certiorari, when a decision on a pertinent issue
would impair the dignity and esteem of the Court. A few Justices might vote to deny review,
fearing the potential holdings of the other Justices on the merits, if the petition were granted.
Harper and Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do, 99 U. OF PA L. Rav. 293, 300
(1950). Similarly, a Justice might vote to deny certiorari to a Circuit Court case, where appeal
would lie, fearing a decision by the other Justices on the nonfederal questions raised. Note that
no such consideration would affect certiorari to state courts, since the scope of permissible
review on certiorari and appeal to state courts do not differ.
89 In most of these tactical considerations, the predicted effect of the "likely holding" plays
an important part. That the Justices contemplate their likely holding suggests that they appraise
the merits of the holding below, when considering certiorari petitions. At a later point this
will be discussed in great detail.
9 0 Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950). The case in-
volved a conviction of the defendant for impeding the administration of justice in a criminal
proceeding by several provocative radio- announcements. The conviction was reversed by the
Maryland Court of Appeals, 193 Md. 390, 67 A.2d 497 (1949).
91 This seems the more likely tactical consideration.
92 .e., by inciting the jury to prejudice.
93 The case involved the heinous murdering of a female child.
94 Supra note 74.
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without prejudice to the parties, certiorari would very possibly be denied.
This policy is but an application of the broader principle stated by the
Court in the Ashwander case 5 that it should avoid deciding Constitutional
questions when the case may otherwise be disposed of.
Inadvisability of review based on the unseasonable timing of the peti-
tion is the other tactical factor." The Stuyvesant Town case97 is conveni-
ently -exemplificative of this consideration. Immediately prior to the case,
the United States Supreme Court had spearheaded great reforms against
color discrimination. The Stuyvesant Town case definitely presented a
more extreme situation, harder to decide in favor of non-discrimination.
In the preceding cases the enforcability problem was difficult, though not
insurmountable. But to bar discrimination in all private-publicly owned
housing, before the factions of intolerance became accustomed to the earlier
decisions, was no doubt considered to be a fruitless step. I submit that the
Supreme Court looks to the enforcability of the likely holding, as a tactical
consideration.
It seems to me that the Stuyvesant case also illustrates a denial of cer-
tiorari in order to avoid detrimental social repercussions that the likely
holding would have caused at that time. A holding in favor of the injunc-
tion might have been the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. The
losing interests in the previous discrimination cases had swallowed the
anti-discrimination decisions, though reluctantly A holding for the Plain-
tiff in the Stuyvesant case by the highest court in the land might not have
been swallowable by these same interests. Non-compliance with such a
holding, with carryover to delayed rejection of the prior Supreme Court
holdings, was far from a whimsical prediction. Needness to say, the Court
wanted to avoid such a self-defeating result at any cost, in the interest of
effective social reform, as well as a national need for private, public and
all other kinds of housing.98
It would be sheer frivolity to suggest that a holding for an injunction
in the Stuyvesant case could have been made effective through the normal
channels,9" without the voluntary cooperation of realty owners and land-
lords everywhere. Moreover, to say that the United States Supreme Court
should have granted certiorari -and affirmed, because of the exigencies of
the times, would certainly be to advocate a step in the wrong direction and
9 5 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis con-
currence).
96 Harper and Rosenthal, suprr note 88, at 299.
9 7 Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981
(1950). The court below had upheld the validity of racial discrimination in semi-public housing.
9 8 It is well to note that these tactical considerations are often quite close to "political
question" jurisdictional limitations.
99 L.e, contempt procedure.
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a rejection of the notion that the highest court is to lead and not be led.
It was incumbent on the Supreme Court to deny review, as it did. 00
If there had been prospects of an imminent change in relevant public
sentiment, perhaps a tactical delay by the Court in deciding Mr. Dorsey's
petition would have been more appropriate than a tactical dismissal there-
of. The technique of "tactical delay" is particularly useful when a pending
decision is likely to facilitate review of the case for which the petition has
been filed. 01
H. Substantive Factors
Thus far we have seen three broad types of considerations that the
Supreme Court frequently and overtly holds to be controlling. But none of
these truly falls within the general considerations enumerated in Rule 38.5,
those relating to the nature of the issues raised by the decision below 1
02
In comparison to the more specific material available pertaining to the
previously discussed factors, there is even a more noticeable dearth of spe-
cificity respecting this one. Because of the Doctrine of Secrecy's more
severe toll on an analysis of the substantive factors, method is a genuine
problem. The great bulk of opinions, records, petitions, and briefs makes
naked induction quite impossible. Construction of hypotheses followed by
examination of the available sources for verification is in my opinion the
most effective approach.
One common theory is that the Supreme Court has varied certiorari
policies, depending upon the nature of the lower court. Thus, different
treatment is given certiorari to Courts of Appeals, to the Court of Appeals
of D.C., to state courts, and to the Court of Claims. Underlying this theory
is the premise that there are clear distinctions between the nature of cases
handled by each class of courts. Realistically, however, aside from the
more specialized courts, there is a great deal of overlapping in subject
matter. Moreover, the justices cannot very readily blow hot and cold,
100 One can merely speculate that the Court would well have preferred to avoid review of
Brown v. Board of Education, 98 F Supp. 797 (1951), which came up last term on appeal.
20 U.S.L.WEEK 3325 (1952) (probable jurisdiction noted). A number of current Supreme
Court cases involve segregation m secondary schools. All, however, except the Brown case,
contained examples of unequal treatment. But with the Brown case, the Court is forced to face
the problem of segregation though equality, at a time when the "separate but equal" doctrine
has only dubious enforcability
1Ol The tactical delay may result from motion by a party Murray v. City of New York,
308 U.S. 528 (1940). Or it may be ordered by the Court sua sponte. Manufacturers Trust v.
Prudence Securities Advisory Group, 312 U.S. 649 (1940). In the latter case, certiorari was
granted and the decision below was reversed, the Court having held up the ruling on certiorari
pending the decision in Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Prudence Securities Advisory
Group, 311 U.S. 579 (1941).
102 Hereafter, referred to as the "substantive factors."
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depending on the name of the lower court. Probably the substantive con-
siderations are quite similar, regardless of the lower court. But, if a plural-
istic analysis has any validity, suffice it to say that I intend to appraise
only the factors common to certiorari rulings from all lower courts.
I. Conflict-Importance Theory
Perhaps the most popular hypothesis is the "conflict-importance
theory." It largely parrots the language of Rule 38.5. The assumption of
the theory is that the Supreme Court will always grant certiorari when
there is a conflict of authority among Courts of Appeals, between Courts
of Appeals and state courts, etc.; 10 3 while the Court will grant certiorari
in non-conflict cases only if they raise issues of "importance."
Undoubtedly, the proposition that the Supreme Court invariably grants
certiorari in "conflict cases"1"4 has overwhelming support in all of the
sources of general considerations." 5 One of the very reasons for allowing
certiorari to circuit courts and to state courts was to circumvent the exist-
ence of conflicts of authorities.10
Very early in the history of certiorari, the Supreme Court restricted
the meaning of a "conflict," largely limiting it to the more embarrassing
conflict situations. 10 7 Hence, a mere conflict in general principles is not a
"conflict."'' 0 What would otherwise be a conflict is not such, if one of the
authorities is quite antiquated. 9 A conflict among Courts of Appeals re-
specting a question of state law is also not sufficient." 0
103 Generally thought not included are conflicts between Courts of Appeals and federal
district courts. ROBERTSON AND KIRXHAM, JURISDICTIoN or TnE SuP'EMM COURT 637 (Wolfson
and Kurland ed. 1951). A Court of Appeals decision is superior to that of a district court in its
own circuit. If the district court lies in another circuit, the Supreme Court considers the con-
flict not to be substantial, since the Court of Appeals superior to the district court involved
may yet remove the conflict. But, if the district court decision was appealable directly to the
Supreme Court, it is apparently felt that such conflicts are not likely to be resolvable in the
future; hence certiorari might well be granted. See Shapiro v. United States, cert. granted,
331 U.S. 801 (1947) ; 335 U.S. 1, 4 (1948). Certiorari was granted to resolve conflict with United
States v. Hoffman, 68 F.Supp. 53 (1946).
104 Of course, m many cases of apparent conflict, a demal of certiorari can be explained
as a finding by the Supreme Court that there in fact was no conflict. Layne & Bowler Corp.
v. Western Well Works, 261 U.S. 387, 392 (1923) (cert. dismissed).
105 Justice Van Devanter has said, "Whenever we find such a conflict that, without more,
leads to the granting of the petition, . "Hearings before Committee on Judiciary on S. 2060,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1924). Also 66 CONG. Rxc. 2753 (1925).
106 21 CONG. REC. 10222 (1890) and 52 CONG. REC. 276 (1914).
107 "Certiorari is granted. in cases where there is a real and embarrassing conflict of
opinion and authority ." N.L.R.B. v. Pittsburgh Steamship, 340 U.S. 498, 502 (1951).
108 S=r AN GRnss", SuPRimn COURT PAcTc 100 (1950).
109 Id. at 101, Frankfurter and Hart, Business of the Supreme Court, 51 HARv. L. REv.
577, 596 (1938).
110 Since the Erie case, this can not even be said to be a real conflict.
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But apparently not all "conflict cases," even when so narrowly defined,
are reviewed on certiorari."' For reasons other than formal and tactical
defects, certiorari may be denied despite a "conflict." 11 The Justices may
vote for demal, because the critical issue upon which there is a conflict
may not be of national significance." 3 The conflicting case may be deemed
insufficient to compel review, because its holding below was manifestly
correct." 4 The nonrecurring nature of the issue, respecting which there is
a conflict, is also thought to be a consideration, detracting from the likeli-
hood of certiorari being granted." 5
A case, the petition for certiorari of which came up recently," 6 illus-
trates the Supreme Court's views respecting conflicts. A veteran wished to
purchase a house, priced at $10,195. He needed a Veterans' Administra-
tion guaranteed bank loan. The VA would withhold their guarantee, unless
the purchase price was $9,150 or less." 7 Defendant real estate broker, the
veteran and owners, in order to close the deal, agreed that $9,150 would
appear on the VA loan application, while the balance would take the form
of a separate purchase money mortgage on fixtures, which the VA thought
were included in the realty transaction. The Defendant, as well as the
others, was prosecuted for fraud under one federal penal statute."" He
was fined $5,000 and given two years probation.
The Defendant claimed that prosecution was under the wrong penal
statute, that a less severe one was exclusively apropos." 9 He also claimed
the indictment contained a defect, the failure to allege that he and the
others had knowledge of the falsity of the statements made. The indict-
Ill This may be a new development in Supreme Court certiorari policy. Stern, Denial of
Certiorari Despite a Conflict, 66 HARV. L. REv. 465, 470 (1953). The legislative history seems
to be consistent with such a policy The original draft of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act
provided for automatic review of conflict cases. 21 CONG. REc. 3402 (1890) (H.R. 9014, Sec. 9)
Though H.R. 9014 was almost completely redrafted before the ultimate act was produced, this
provision never survived. Another bill was later introduced in the Senate, again providing for
obligatory review in any conflict situation. 34 CONG. REc. 2432 (1899). See 46 CONG. REc. 1542
(1911) for text of the 1899 bill. We can speculate that it was deemed unwise to so restrict the
Supreme Court, since all conflict cases were not necessarily intended to be reviewed.
112 Frankfurter and Hart, Business of the Supreme Court, 48 HARv. L. REv. 238, 268 (1934).
113 Stern, supra note 111, at 469.
11
4 Id. at 466. The Court would probably be more willing to grant certiorari in a con-
flicts case, where the holding below is the erroneous one. In this manner, the Court can effect
justice in the specific case and resolve the conflict, as well.
115 Id. at 467 Mr. Stern makes reference to cases raising non-moot. conflicting construc-
tions of statutes, which have expired or have been repealed.
116 Aderman v. United States, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 927, rehearing denied, 342 U.S. 950
(1952).
17 L.e., the "reasonable value" appraisal under 38 U.S.C. § 694(a).
118 18 U.S.C. § 80.
119 38 U.S.C. § 715.
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ment did contain allegations that the statement was false, that the parties
agreed to submit such statement to the VA and that they intended to induce
the agency to guarantee the loan. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction. °20
The Defendant's petition for certiorari contained almost exclusively
contentions of conflict, as reasons for granting certiorari. Petitioner argued
that the Court of Appeals decision conflicted with prior cases, holding that
later general penalty statutes supersede earlier ones. The Justices probably
ignored this argument, since it only suggested a conflict of general prin-
ciples. The petition then stated that other Courts of Appeals opinions had
held that the less severe statute was the exclusive penalty for so defraud-
ing the VA. A cursory examination of the cases cited reveals that the other
courts merely held that Section 715 was an appropriate penalty, not that
it was exclusive; hence, the Court evidently saw through this illusory claim
of conflict. The petition then included an argument that a conviction in
spite of the pleading defect conflicted with other Courts of Appeals de-
cisions. Probably the Justices rejected this contention summarily, feeling
a resolution of such a trivial conflict would not even justify spending time
to examine the opinions cited as conflicting.
2. I iportance Theory
An appreciation of the definitional and other qualifications accorded
to conflict situations suggests the inappropriateness of any absolute state-
ment about them. Something more than a mere conflict of authorities is
required to assure a granting of certiorari. The magnitude of importance
of the case raising the conflict seems to be that extra something. By a sort
of dialectic, the two premises of the "conflict-importance theory" merge
into the unitary "importance theory."
It is said that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari, if the case is
"important." This simple statement is quite innocuous; but is it helpful?
Like the terms "negligence" or "due process," "importance" evidently de-
pends upon the number of certain qualities that are present, and the degree
thereof, in the case being considered."2 ' As a carryover from the "conflict-
importance" theory, whether there is or is not a conflict of authority must
necessarily be a critical factor in determining "importance." The fact that
120 The Court of Appeals recognized § 80 as applicable. It rejected the claim of the indict-
ment's insufficiency, feeling that the defendant had been given adequate notice of the charge
by the other allegations. 191 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1951).
121 The fact that the tribunal below may have thought the case to be "important," though
not a factor constituting "importance," may be indicative of the nature of the case. Thus, the
petitioner might mention appropriate language in the opinion below or stress that the Court
of Appeals below sat in banc, when it heard the case.
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there is a conflict among, say, Courts of Appeals contributes to the impor-
tance of the case.12
A second factor, constantly reiterated, is that the case must be of na-
tional importance, as opposed to private importance. 23 At one time there
was some doubt as to whether this distinction should be recognized, 24 but,
because of the great number of certiorari petitions filed each year, this
factor cannot be ignored under our present unichamber Supreme Court
system.
Despite the everpresent remonstrances that, in considering petitions
for certiorari, the Justices do not examine the merits of the case, 125 most
commentators 26 would concede that the correctness or the erroneousness
of the decision below is a factor.1' Certiorari will tend to be denied, if the
holding below is patently correct, particularly if it is consistent with a prior
and enduring Supreme Court opinion. And certiorari is more likely to be
granted if the holding below appears to be erroneous, especially if it is
contrary to a prior decision of the Supreme Court. 28 Probably the Justices
appraise the likelihood of error in the decision below in two ways: one by
considering the issues represented," the other by superficially examining
the opinion or opinions below, giving special attention to the presence or
absence of accord among and within the various tribunals. 3 °
122 See SEN. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., ist Sess. 39 (1937) (Hughes' statement) Even con-
flicts between Courts of Appeals and district courts, where the opinion of the latter is not
directly appealable to the Supreme Court, are significant. See United States v. Constantine,
296 U.S. 287, 290 (1935). Cf. note 103, supra.
123 Taft, Juvrsdiction of the Supreme Court, 35 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1925).
3
2 4 See 66 CONG. REc. 2928 (1925) and 81 CONG. REc. 2810, 3326 (1937).
125 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 226ff (1950)
126 STERN AND GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 113, 115 (1950).
127 And there is little doubt that this consideration is an extremely important one, seeming
at times to actually be controlling. Illustrative is the occasional review of cases raising con-
struction questions under such overworked statutes as the FELA and the Federal Safety Ap-
pliance Act, though the issues have long been settled.
In Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay RR, cert. granted, 336 U.S. 935, 338 U.S. 430
(1949), the Court granted certiorari despite Mr. Justice Frankfurter's obviously valid conten-
tion that the case involved nothing of national importance, the issues no longer being open.
The Fifth Circuit had affirmed the trial court's holding that negligence was a prerequisite to
liability under the FSAA and that contributory negligence was a defence under the FELA.
170 F.2d 719 (1948). The holding was obviously contrary to the statutory provisions. Certio-
rari was apparently granted for no other reason than to impeach an incorrect decision below.
128 Rule 38.5(b) (4).
129 1 shall discuss this in detail later.
13oIf there is unanimity among the judges in the lower tribunal or among the hierarchy
of tribunals through which the case has come, most likely the decision below is correct. And
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A fourth consideration is the uniqueness or recurring nature of the issue
among past, present and future cases.' 3 ' If a decision on the merits stands
to affect numerous pending and future cases, the Justices would tend to
consider it incumbent upon themselves to grant review.
Where the issue in question is of the recurring variety and the decision
below is in favor of the Plaintiff, the Court is quite likely to grant review,
3 2
as was the case in Hiatt v. Brown.1ss There, a soldier had been sentenced
to prison by a court-martial. He petitioned for habeas corpus, claiming
that the military tribunal "lacked jurisdiction." Under the Articles of War,
the court-martial must have contained at least one member of the Judge
Advocate General, unless such a member was "not available." 134 The pris-
oner, contending a JAG officer was available but not included, maintained
that the military court lacked jurisdiction. The federal district court found
for the prisoner, the Respondent on certiorari;"3 5 and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.30 On review the Supreme Court reversed, saying that the ques-
tion of "availability" was to be left to the discretion of the appointing
officer; thus, the issue was not open to the federal district court, unless an
abuse of discretion could be shown. In retrospect it was not surprising that
certiorari was granted. If the Court had denied review in this case, a mul-
titude of sentences by court-martial would have been affected; and the
non-unanimity in the opinion below has apparently been recognized as a factor itself raising
sufficient doubt to compel review. N.L.R.B. v. Rockaway News, 345 U.S. 71, 72 (1953). The
more times the case has been reviewed and the same result has been achieved, the less likely
is there error. The validity of such an assumption and its application to granting or denying
certiorari seems to have been contemplated by Congress. H.R. REP. No. 1182, 63rd Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1914).
On the other hand, if there is dissension among the judges below, the Justices will examine
more carefully for error. If tribunals below differed in their treatment of the case, or only one
tribunal examined the merits of the case, direct observation of the merits must be undertaken.
The Justices also give some consideration to the number of consistent holdings by other
courts on the same issue. At least the Government believes this to be a consideration. In Ann
Arbor Press v. N.L.R.B., cert. dented, 342 U.S. 859 (1951), the Fifth Circuit's opinion had
rejected the employer's contention that the Board must show the union's compliance with sec-
tions 9(f), (g) and (h), as part of the charge of an unfair labor practice. On page four of the
Government's brief m opposition to certiorari, it is pointed out that three circults have come
to the same conclusion; and that no circuit has a dissenting view.
131 This factor is related to another, that certiorari is more likely to be granted, the more
parties there are to the action. It would seem feasible that the Court is more likely to grant
certiorari and dispose of the rights or duties of several thousand persons in a class action, that
it would be respecting a suit involving only one member of the class.
132 A decision in favor of the plamtiff coupled with the fact that a recurring question is
involved opens the door to much future litigation.
133 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
13441 STAT. 788 (1920).
L81 F.Supp. 647 (1948).
130 175 F.2d 273 (1949).
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courts would have been cluttered with an equal number of habeas corpus
petitions.
If the Fifth Circuit had reversed the trial court in the Hiatt case, a
denial of certiorari would not have had the aforementioned repercussions,
hence, discretionary review by the Supreme Court would not have been
so certain. Thus, if a decision below was for the defendant, the fact that a
recurring issue is raised is still significant; 1' but the greater compulsion
to grant review is not present. The Court's denial of certiorari in American
Elastics, Inc. v. United States"" may demonstrate this view In that case
the Plaintiff sued the Government on a war surplus contract, clairmng the
goods were not up to specifications, notwithstanding the existence of an
"gas is clause" on the reverse side of the contract. American Elastics claimed
that the "as is clause" was invalid. The Court of Appeals had held for valid-
ity If the decision had gone the other way, thousands of war surplus con-
tracts would have been affected, and thousands of prospective plaintiffs
would have rubbed their hands in glee. But since the Court of Appeals had
held for the Government, the Supreme Court did not feel the pressure,
which was probably present in the court-martial case.
On the other hand, if the case below is quite unique, the Justices are
more likely to deny review Some doubt of this proposition was raised in
the recent case of United States v. Shannon,' 9 involving an application of
the Anti-Assignment Act, 4 ' which prohibits litigating a claim against the
United States by a pre-judgment assignee of such claim. The assignee in
the Shannon case had joined the assignor as a party, thereby contending
that the purposes of the Anti-Assignment Act were satisfied, and hence
the statute was inapplicable. The Fourth Circuit held for the assignee.
Certiorari was granted. 41 After argument the Supreme Court reversed,
notwithstanding Mr. Justice Frankfurter's claim that certiorari should
have been dismissed, having been improvidently granted. Justice Frank-
furter contended that the case presented such a non-recurring issue that a
dismissal was the only sensible treatment. The Court at no point denied
this contention of uniqueness.1' Other cases would tend to confirm what
Justice Frankfurter argued in the Shannon case, that the Supreme Court is
137 See Dalchite v. U.S., 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (Test case in Texas City disaster litigation).
138 187 F.2d 109; cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951).
139 342 U.S. 288 (1952).
14031 U.S.C. 203 (1952).
141342 U.S. 808 (1951).
142 342 U.S. 288, 294 (1952). Perhaps justice Frankfurter's view of the case merely reveals
a failure on his part to appreciate the policy, previously mentioned, m favor of deciding the
case on the merits, once a substantial part of the argument has been heard.
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abandoning non-recurrability as a factor compelling denials of certiorari.
One could not be intellectually honest, if he failed to recognize that
certiorari is more likely to be granted when the case is easy to consider.
The purpose of statutory certiorari was basically to save the time of the
Supreme Court. Granting certiorari for a case that can be rapidly consid-
ered and decided does not subvert this purpose, and it does give. justice to
the parties. The Court's willingness to grant review when a case raising
identical or related questions is already on review illustrates this factor.
143
Its reluctance where the facts are complicated or the record, the reading
of which is indispensable to deciding, is inordinately long' exemplifies
the corrolary.
Several caveats should be stated. It cannot be doubted that the Su-
preme Court generally strives for consistency in certiorari policy ' 45 More-
over, the Justices are probably more willing to review cases raising issues
which the Court has neither generally nor specifically resolved previous-
ly 14' And the Court is less willing to review an issue which they have pre-
viously labored, unless the decision below is inconsistent with the earlier
decision; or the earlier decision bears reexamination.
The case coming up on certiorari must not be just of current impor-
tance. 4 7 In the interest of preserving the dignity of the Court and promot-
ing consistency in certiorari policy, this seems to be a sound qualification.
But perhaps the soundest justification is the desirabilit of avoiding the
distorting influence on the corpus juris, that frequently results from decid-
ing cases of immediate but fleeting importance. A granting of certiorari in
such cases runs the danger suggested by Justice Holmes in the Northern
Securities case.' 48 "Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great
cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the
law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelm-
ing interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These
immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes
what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well set-
1.1 Robertson and Kirkham, supra note 103, at 672. Sometimes the Court prefers to hold
up the decision on certiorari, pending decision of the other case on the merits.
1.4 The denial in Mollonee v. Fahey, 345 U.S. 952 (1953), which -involved the longest
record m the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in recent years, may be illustrative.
14 5 Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, 261 U.S. 387, 393 (1923).
146 Rule 38.5(b) (3), Worcester County Trust v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 296 (1934).
1.1
7 Certiorari has been denied in cases raising important questions of validity and con-
struction of a statute, because the statute had since been repealed. District of Columbia v.
Sweeney, 310 U.S. 631 (1940).
1418 Northern Securities v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904).
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tled principles of law will bend." Thus, this caveat really serves to protect
the Court from its own infirmities.
Another more frequently articulated limitation is that the issue must
not be one of mere fact, with all parties substantially in accord respecting
the controlling principles of law 14 The Supreme Court is no more compe-
tent to decide questions of fact than the lower review tribunals, while it
has a peculiar competency regarding issues of law As one would expect, to
distinguish between an issue of law and fact is often difficult. Moreover,
I suspect that, even in the absence of palpably unjust findings below, the
Justices occasionally disregard the distinction. Federal Employers Liability
Act cases, especially those where the holding below was for the employer,
are conveniently typical of this tendency 150 Such departures may manifest
Court sympathies toward certain categories of losing parties.'' Or the
Justices may be attempting to minimize the effects of a settled legal prin-
ciple, which is considered by them to be undesirable. This may be particu-
larly true in the FELA cases, where a number of Justices consider the
negligence prerequisite of employer liability to be outmoded in the new era
of workmen's compensation statutes,152 and hence tend to make this statu-
tory requirement almost meaningless in some instances.
At this point it might be well to recapitulate. There are a number of
factors relevant to a finding of "importance" or "unimportance" in a given
case. Some are more influential than others. Traditionally "conflict" and
"national importance" have been thought to be at the top of the scale. But,
as has been mentioned, the mere presence of a conflict is not invariably
controlling. "National importance" is thought to be the most decisive
factor.' 53 All of the other considerations have heretofore been recognized
as having only marginal significance. If the national importance of a non-
conflict case is not patent, certiorari is more likely to be granted if any of
the following conditions are present: recurrence of the issue, manifest in-
149 SEN. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., ist Sess. 40 (1937) (Hughes' letter to Wheeler) , Leviton
v. United States, 343 U.S. 946 (1952), Hart, Busizness of the Supreme Court, 53 HARv. L. REv.
579, 595 (1940).
150 In a recent case the Court justified its granting of certiorari "because of the impor-
tance of preserving for litigants in FELA cases their right to a jury trial." Wilkerson v. Mc-
Carthy, cert. granted, 335 U.S. 807, reversed, 336 U.S. 53, 55 (1949). The opimon by Justice
Black was exclusively devoted to an evaluation of the evidence, resulting in the conclusion that
there was enough evidence on the issue of negligence to constitute a jury question.
151 Id. at 67
152 Id. at 65. See also Standard Oil v. United States, 340 U.S. 54, 61f (1950).
153 Hearings before Committee on Judiciary on S. 2060, 68th Cong., ist Sess. 21 (1924).
Before a Senate Committee m 1935, Chief Justice Hughes said, "When it comes to further
review by the Supreme Court of the United States, the higher principle of importance to the
public at large is involved." Hearings before Committee on Judiciary on S. 2176, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7 (1935).
[Vol. 6
CERTIORARI: ITS DIAGNOSIS AND CURE
correctness of the decision below or simplicity of the case. And the petition
is less likely to be granted if the marginal factors are present in their nega-
tive extremes, or if any of the caveats are transgressed. But what if the
petition presents a case where the marginal factors, as well as the national
importance criterion, are not illuminating?
3. "Tentative Examination Theory"
At the outset of my consideration of the "importance theory," I queried
whether the theory is helpful.1 4 Awareness of the factors constituting
"importance" almost always discloses whether the Supreme Court will
grant or deny certiorari in the obvious cases. Thus, most members of the
Supreme Court Bar would have predicted that certiorari would be granted
in the Gold Clause cases,1 5 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,"
and Williams v. North Carolina.57
And obviously unimportant cases generally are not reviewed on cer-
tiorari. Hence, the Supreme Court refused to grant review in American
Elastics v. United States.5 " In that case, involving a war surplus contract,
the plaintiff had waived a condition broken by accepting delivery of the
goods. The plaintiff, however, sued for rescission of the contract and resti-
tution of the amount paid. The Court of Appeals said that the plaintiff's
only remedy was for contract damage recovery; and since he had neither
so pleaded nor proved damages below, the district court's holding for the
defendant was affirmed. Probably the nice procedural issue of whether the
case shoud have been dismissed or remanded for trial on damages was not
considered worthy of review.
In appraising a petition, the Justices will see through a baseless conten-
tion that issues, indisputably of "obvious importance," are actually raised
154 Its non-utility is first suggested by the very purpose underlying statutory certiorari,
the limiting of the Supreme Court's business. If the Court is to be kept busy but not over-
worked, the freedom with which it grants certiorari must vary almost directly with the number
of petitions that are annually filed, the complexity of the cases involved and the burden of the
Court's other chores. The denotations of "important" must necessarily vary from year to year.
Frankfurter and Hart, Business of the Supreme Court, 48 HARv. L. RaV. 238, 241 (1934). See
also Hearings before Committee on Judiciary on S. 1392, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 176 (1937) (tes-
timony of Professor Edward Corwin).
155 Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio R, 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
It has frequently been contended that the amount of money at issue is not relevant to
"national importance." Hearings before Committee on Judiciary on S. 2176, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1935) (testimony of Chief Justice Hughes). But it would probably be conceded that
such contentions are merely democratic gestures, since the disposition of great amounts of mon-
etary resources is indisputably of national importance. See Dalchite v. United States, 346 U.S.
15(1953).
150 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
157 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
15n See note 138 supra.
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by the case. 59 Though the case raises an obviously important issue, the
fact that the decision below was manifestly correct 6 nullifies the likeli-
hood of certiorari being granted. 6'
The certainty of forecast provided by the "importance theory" for the
"obvious cases" brings out in bold relief the theory's failings. Most of the
cases coming before the Supreme Court are not within the "obvious" cate-
gory; they fall somewhere in between cases where certiorari should un-
doubtedly be granted and cases where denial is almost certain. 6  In these
"nuddleground cases," distinctions between "nationally important" and
''privately important", between "simplicity" and "complexity", between
"questions of fact" and "questions of law", et al. are not fruitful. If these
were the only factors that the Court considers, their innate indefiniteness
would nullify any chances of sensible predictability as to whether certiorari
will be granted or denied. The practitioner would be unable to determine
at all accurately the prudence of going through the certiorari application
procedure.
Fortunately the Justices consider another distinction, the correctness
159 Southern Power v. North Carolina Public Service, 263 U.S. 508 (1923)
16OIn Betterman v American Stores, 367 Pa. 193, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951),
whether the Interstate Commerce Commission trucking rate schedules provided a mammum,
as well as a minimum, rate was raised. The Pennsylvania Court held that the ICC schedule
only set a minimum. The importance of the issue was unquestionable; but the obvious correct-
ness of the decision, in light of the legislative history of the whole Interstate Commerce Act
program, was manifestly correct.
161 Stern and Gressman, supra note 108, at 177
Respecting this principle, Chief Justice Taft said the following: "It is a mistake to sup-
pose that the mere suggestion of a constitutional question is something that should require the
case going right through. The court ought to be able shortly to say whether the suggestion has
any real substance when tested by recognized constitutional principles. You can cite the Four-
teenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment and you can get up a great deal of fog, which
it is the business of the court, and which it ought to have a prompt opportunity to clear away
by saying, 'This case, although it purports to involve a constitutional question, really does not,
and we cut it off.'" 81 CONG. REC. 3325 (1937) (reproduction of testimony before House
Judiciary Committee in 1924)
162 Another issue was raised in the Betterman case, supra note 160, which exemplifies the
"middleground case." In that case a trucker was suing the chain store on a contract. Illegality
was used as a defense. I have discussed the defendant's first basis for claiming illgality, that
the contract provided for rates above those in the ICC rate schedule. A second basis was that
the contract was not filed with the ICC, as required by statute. 54 STAT. 925 (1940). The 1940
amendment directed the filing of rates "actually maintained and charged." The plaintiff had
filed, prior to the 1940 amendment, documents showing that he was at least charging the mini-
mum rates. Admittedly this did not fulfill the new directive. The Pennsylvania court held that
though the statute was technically violated, the policy of the Interstate Commerce Act was not
sufficiently offended to deny the plaintiff recovery. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. The
case does not fall within any of the extremes of the standards suggested. How does the Supreme
Court tackle such a case? How can the Court bar provide suitable arguments for such a case?
How can the decisions of the Justices be predicted?
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or erroneousness of the decision below Like the other factors, if the de-
cision below is obviously erroneous"' or obviously correct, 64 absent other
determinative circumstances, the rulings on certiorari can be predicted
with considerable confidence. But this factor achieves a degree of individ-
uality in the "middleground case." I submit, that not only do the Justices
appraise the correctness of the decision below but that, the views of the
Justices, when considering a certiorari petition in the "middleground case,"
are largely dominated by such an appraisal. Moreover, their evaluation of
the merits of the decision is much more predictable than their thoughts
respecting the other factors. If the views of the Justices on the merits are
both predictable and controlling, the repercussions might be far reaching.
There would be a fairly accurate standard to deterrmne the advisability
of petitioning for certiorari in a given case. The draftsman of the petition
or opposing brief would be certain to clarify the propriety or impropriety
of the decision below And finally, the directional change in the petition
and briefs would better aid the Justices in making their respective rulings
on certiorari.'
Let us examine the soundness of the three premises."' Do the Justices
appraise the merits of the case below when considering a certiorari peti-
tion? A practice of abstention is publicized as the policy of the Supreme
Court.1 7 The result has been what I call the "non-merit myth." It has been
reiterated countless times, especially in recent years. Two reasons have
been offered to support this abstention policy. The seldom expressed one
is that, if the Justices examined the merits of the petition and then granted
certiorari, they could not hear a subsequent full dress argument without
263 If a case is most obviously incorrect, the order granting certiorari will be accompa-
med by a summary reversal. See N.L.R.B. v. Mexa Textile Mills, 339 U.S. 563, 571 (1950).
164 "If the case be one in which obviously the decision below is right and there is no
ground for debate or cavil about it, it is very much better that that be said at once and that
the litigants be freed from the vexation of further delay and uncertainty, and also that the
court be relieved from further attention to that case and be permitted to give attention to other
cases calling for deliberate hearing and consideration." Hearings before Committee on Jutdi-
ciary on S.2060, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1924) (testimony of Justice Van DeVanter).
Professor Zechariah Chafee has suggested that this principle applies in a most extreme
manner. He offers an explanation for one demal of certiorari, though there was an obvious
deprivation of procedural due process m the trial court, that the substantive holding of the
court below was obviously correct. CHA.EE, SOME PROB s oF EQUITY (1950).
165 A dearer treatment of the correctness of the decision below by the petition and briefs
would not only assure more accurate and consistent rulings by the Supreme Court; but it would
also increase the predictability of the rulings on certiorari, since the chance factor is minimized
when all of the arguments are consciously put before the tribunal.
166 I.e., that the Justices examine the merits of the decision below, that their views on the
merits are predictable, and that such views are controlling.
167Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 844 (1950), Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show,
338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950).
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preconceived prejudices. The more commonly advanced reason is that the
time consumption required to examine the merits on each petition would
be prohibitive."6 This reason is unimpeachable, even if the Justices were
thoroughly to consider the merits relating only to petitions that cannot be
disposed of on formal, jurisdictional or tactical grounds or do not present
"obvious cases."
But if the examnation of the merits is merely cursory, rather than
thorough, the time consumption argument can have no validity I maintain
that the Justices, in examining a "middleground case," make a quite brief
"tentative examination" of the merits; but of this I shall speak more thor-
oughly later. Suffice it to say at present that each Justice briefly examines
the merits and comes to what he considers to be a tentative conclusion. If
the Justice tentatively considers the decision below to be incorrect, he will
vote for granting certiorari; 169 or, if tentatively correct, he will vote for
denial.17 If certiorari is granted, bias in the later hearing would be un-
likely, since the Court would realize that their prior views were only tenta-
tive. Thus, the first-mentioned reason supporting the "non-merit myth"
is also not too convincing. Not only are the reasons underlying the pur-
ported non-merit policy insubstantial, but the plausibility of the policy is
questionable. Can an individual examine opinions, petitions and briefs, and
sometimes a record, to see if there are any formal or jurisdictional defects,
to consider any jurisprudential tactics, and to determine if the case is
"important" without considering the correctness or the erroneousness of
the decision below?
1 71
A few statements of specific considerations have considerably under-
mined the "non-merit myth."' 72 The inclusion of certain language in the
Baltimore Radio Show case provides an inference that the merits are con-
sidered and do influence the final outcome of the petition for certiorari, at
least in many cases. 3 The majority opimon in Darr v. Burford"l4 seems
168 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 227ff (1950).
169 This process was intimated by the language of White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 762
(1945), where the court pointed out that certiorari had been granted, since the petitioner had
made out a "prima facie" case that habeas corpus was improperly denied in the state court
below. See Isserman v Ethics Committee, 345 U.S. 927 (1953) (dissent to denial of certiorari)
170 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 544ff (1953)
171 Chief Justice Hughes candidly endorsed the advisability of consciously examining the
merits while considering the petition. McElwain, Business of the Supreme Court, 63 HARV. L.
REV. 5, 13 (1949).
172 See Frank, The United States Supreme Court, 16 U. oF CHi. L. REV. 1, 34 (1948),
17 U. or Cm. L. REv. 1, 39 (1949).
173 "The one thing that can be said with certainty about the Court's denial of Maryland's
petition in this case is that it does not remotely imply approval or disapproval of what was
said by the Court of Appeals of Maryland." 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950). (Emphasis added.)
1 74
Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
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to support this inference. The opinion pointed out that the federal district
courts are free either to recognize a refusal to review a state criminal de-
cision on certiorari as an affirmance on the merits or as not on the merits
at all.715 Whether such certiorari denials are or are not recognitions of the
correctness of the state court decisions was a problem of construction
before federal district courts not infrequently. But, even under these cir-
cumstances, the majority opinion only advised that, if the case is not on
the merits, words to that effect might be appended to the denial of certio-
rari 76 Hence, where there was a good chance that the denial of certiorari
would be considered an affirmance of the decision below, the Supreme
Court was willing to leave this impression, unless it expressly negated it.
1 7
On reading the language in various opinions that seem to betray the
"non-merit myth," one feels that the relevant statements were accidentally
made, or were at least mentioned with some reluctance. The same absence
of straightforwardness is present in the occasional statement of more gen-
eral considerations exposing the "non-merit myth.""7 8 Why all of the con-
cealment? Why the publicity for the "non-merit myth" and the obscuring
of the tentative examination practice? The "doctrine of secrecy" would of
course account for concealment of the operation in specific cases.179 Our
attention must be focussed on statements of general considerations. The
lengthy discussion in the Darr case is perhaps the best statement of the
reason, particularly Justice Frankfurter's dissent. 80 The Justice hypothe-
sizes that if word got around that the Supreme Court considers the merits,
all sorts of misinterpretations of rulings on certiorari petitions would
175 The recent case of Brown v. Allen, supra note 170, which will be discussed below, has
overruled this aspect of the Darr decision; but the inferences of the Darr opinion nevertheless
remain.
1 76 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 215 (1950). "If this Court has doubts concerning the
basis of state court judgments, the matter may be handled as m Burke v. Georgia, 338 U.S. 941,
with an express direction that the petitioner may proceed m the federal district court without
prejudice from the denial of his petition for certiorari."
1 77 See Pippin v. Nierstheimer, 337 U.S. 942 (1949).
178 Justice Van DeVanter, stressing the benefits of a denial to review a non-meritorious,
dilatory attempt to obtain review, unwittingly revealed that the Justices do examine the merits.
See note 164 supra.
179 A simultaneous rejection of both the "doctrine of secrecy" and the "non-merit myth"
has some inherent difficulties. A demal of certiorari accompanied by the explanation, "because
we though the decision below was correct," may seem harmless; but irate counsel and law pro-
fessors, who have spent considerably more than a few minutes to examine the petition, might
well pulverize the Court. However, rather than reject the suggested reform, the Court should
carefully phrase its explanation, stressing the tentativeness of the decision, thereby appeasing
critics and avoiding unfounded precedent overtones. And the Court should sensibly use its
discretion in determining to just which cases they should add an opinion explaining the denial.
An abandonment of the "doctrine of secrecy" is not advocated to supply the petitioner with
information why he lost his case, rather it is to improve certiorari practice.
180339 U.S. 200, 224ff (1950).
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result."' 1 A denial of certiorari would indicate to many an affirmance of
the decision below 182 Such an impression might well be erroneous, since
the denial may have been based on some other consideration, previously
mentioned in this paper, or a combination thereof .1
3
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's fears may be well founded. But from such
a thesis to conclude that the Supreme Court should not consider the merits
is a non sequitur. The Justice probably recognizes this logical fallacy; but
he may feel that constant reiteration of the "non-merit myth" serves to
avoid any possibility of misunderstanding.18 This deception may in part
be justified by the potentially disastrous effects of any rmsinterpretation
of a denial of certiorari, particularly in habeas corpus cases.8 5 The pru-
dence of Justice Frankfurter's ruse is now only academic, at least pertain-
ing to habeas corpus cases. The recent case of Brown v Allen ls6 took the
position that federal district courts must never treat denials of certiorari
in habeas corpus cases as affirmance of the state decision below 117 As one
181 "Mr. Justice Reed's opinion (that a demal of certiorari may or may not indicate an
affirmance of the decision below) makes a Delphic disposition of this issue, which will inevitably
create confusion among federal judges." Ibid.
182 Regardless of the "non-merit myth," denials of certiorari have some weight as prece-
dent in the eyes of the judiciary and the bar. Harper and Pratt, What the Supreme Court Did
Not Do, 101 U. OF PA. L. REv. 439, 444 (1953). And the Supreme Court is well aware of the
weight given denials of certiorari. Mr. justice Rutledge has stated, "Although denial of cer-
tiorari is not to be taken as expression of opinion on any case, it would be idle to claim that it
has no actual or reasonable influence upon the practical judgment of lawyers " Sunal v.
Large, 332 U.S. 174, 192 (1947).
183 For this reason the Supreme Court does not tolerate citing of a denial of certiorari as
indicative of the views of that Court on the merits of a decision. Peacock, Purpose of Certiorari,
15 A.B.A.J. 681 (1929)
184 Despite the observations in note 182 supra, the "non-merit myth" ruse has been enu-
nently successful in this regard. Inappropriate would be a current article complaining of the
magnitude of precedent effect given to denials of certiorari by lower courts, as was written in
the late twenties. See Moore, Right of Review by Certiorari, 17 Gao. L.J. 307 (1929).
185 As was pointed out in the Darr case, an interpretation by the federal district court that
the Supreme Court affirmed the merits of the state holding by denying certiorari could easily
lead to a denial of habeas corpus solely on such possibly erroneous ground. Justice Reed at-
tempted to dispel such fears by pointing out that res judicata has no place in the law of habeas
corpus. Moreover, the federal district courts are aware that the Supreme Court may not have
based the denial on the merits. As Justice Reed made clearer in a more recent case, he only
wanted to condone federal district court refusals to hear the habeas corpus petition, when the
record revealed that the Supreme Court denied certiorari because of the obvious non-meritori-
ousness of the petitioner's claim. Brown v Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 457 (1953).
186 Ibid.
187 Thus, the Reed forces have capitulated to those of Frankfurter. It might be noted that
their differences were not great, disagreement only dealing with federal district court treatment
of a denial of certiorari where the record presents an obviously non-meritorious claim. Even
this victory may prove to be an empty one. The practice of federal district courts to refuse
habeas corpus to the petitioner on a cursory examination of the record and opinions of the
state courts, without giving weight to a denial of certiorari intervening, is condoned by the
opinion. Ibid.
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would expect, the language of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Brown case
has wavered from his tenacious support of the "non-merit myth" in earlier
cases."s The Justices seem more willing to abandon the myth, when they
are assured that its protection is less necessary.189
In a case, where neither the national importance or unimportance nor
the correctness or erroneous of the decision below, nor any of the other
factors, are near obvious, why should the Supreme Court's views as to the
latter distinction be more predictable than as to the former?19 The con-
notation of "nationally important" is in flux. Most would contend that
change is also characteristic of American constitutional law. Variation in
the meaning of "nationally important" is a product of changes in history,
economics, politics, science, etc. 1 ' Some would say that shifts in the law
are likewise attributable to these factors. But none would deny that the
doctrine of stare decisis acts as an insulator, thereby greatly minimizing
the effects of alegal mutations in our society on the law The meaning of
"nationally important" has no such insulation. Various sociological impon-
derables forever are changing "nationally important," while "legal correct-
ness" tends to be sheltered from these influences. Thus, "nationally im-
portant" is a more elusive target for the practitioner, as well as for the
Justice. Few would dispute that the Justices of the United States Supreme
Court are students experienced in the field of American constitutional law
Few would contend that the Justices have equal competence in the fields
upon which the meaning of "nationally important" depends. Behavior of
the relatively uninformed is quite less predictable, than that of the well
trained subject. Moreover, because the average attorney also is better
trained in the law than in the other sciences, he is best able to anticipate
the thought processes of the Justices respecting legal correctness, rather
than respecting denotations of "nationally important."
What technique can be utilized to take advantage of this predictabil-
ity? A two-stage method seems feasible. Primarily, the patterns of judicial
behavior of each Justice must be ascertained. And secondly, the certiorari
petition in question must be applied to these predetermined patterns. If it
can be estimated that at least four of the Justices are traditionally not sym-
,88 "It is within the experience of every member of this Court that we do not have to, and
frequently do not, reach the merits of a case to decide that it is not of sufficient importance
to warrant review here." Id. at 4170. Thus, at least equally as frequently, the Justices do
consider the merits.
189 The Brown case prohibited any res judicata effect to a denial, but it did not substan-
tially disrupt the stare decisis or precedent effect of a denial of certiorari.
190 1 am limiting my comparison to the national importance or unimportance distinction,
since this is the one that is popularly thought to be all controlling.
191 Frankfurter and Hart, Busmness of the Supreme Court, 51 HARv. L. REv. 577, 598 (1938).
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pathetic with the holding in the middleground case below, certiorari is likely
to be granted.
The first stage is perhaps the easier of the two. Certain patterns of
opinion for certain Justices are immediately evident. Let us take a much
discussed problem, the pre-preliminary hearing confession in state criminal
proceedings. The Court is unanimously of the opimon that physically
coerced confessions pursuant to a state criminal proceeding amount to a
denial of due process.'92 Moreover, merciless interrogation with inadequate
food and sleep for long periods of time, all agree is a similar denial.193 But
here the accord ends. When the conditions during the interrogation are not
excessively bad, at least four Justices-Jackson, Vinson, Reed and Burton
-think that a resultant confession is perfectly within the Fourteenth
Amendment.'94 Of the other five Justices on the Vinson Court, at least two
-Black and Douglas-believe that such confessions are per se denials of
due process.' 95 But what are the views of the other three Justices-Frank-
furter, Minton and Clark? In the Agoston case Douglas and Black dis-
sented to the denial of certiorari, claiming that the lower court's decision
was in conflict with the Supreme Court's view in the Turner and Harris
cases, hence, certiorari should have been granted. The two Justices claimed
that the earlier decisions held that pre-preliminary hearing confessions
were per se denials of due process. If at least two of the three remaining
Justices had shared this view, certiorari in the Agoston case would prob-
ably have been granted, at least four Justices recognizing a conflict with
a prior Supreme Court decision. Since certiorari was demed, evidently at
least two of the triumvirate are members of the "anti-per se doctrine
group." As the recent decision in Brown v. Allen shows, Justice Clark, for
one, does not align with Justices Douglas and Black."'
From observing four reported cases, we have deterrmned the views of
seven Justices and have a good idea of the other two. If a state court were
to reverse a conviction on Fourteenth Amendment grounds under the "per
se doctrine" or if a state court were to reject the "per se doctrine," we are
able to predict the views of the Justices respecting such cases. Moreover,
we have some insight as to the degree of depravity that each Justice indi-
vidually considers necessary before the Fourteenth Amendment is violated.
Hence, we may better be able to predict how each Justice will react to a
petition for certiorari, involving a pre-arraignment confession situation.
192 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
193 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
194 Turner v. Pennsylvania, 336 U.S. 62 (1949) (dissents), Harris v. South Carolina,
338 U.S. 68 (1949) (dissents).
195 Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 844 (1950) (dissenting opinion to denial of cer-
tiorari).
196 344 U.S. 443, 488 (1953).
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Fitting a given case into its appropriate pattern may be a little difficult,
particularly the categorization of a unique question. Though the task may
be laborious, fortunately the diversity of the Supreme Court's past opinions
affords a wealth of analogous situations from which to draw.
Equally fundamental to the "tentative examination theory" is the third
premise, that the votes of the individual Justices on a petition for certiorari
in "middleground cases" are largely a proauct of their views respecting the
propriety of the decision below.
1 97
A quite unimpeachable axiom is that voluntary behavior, to the extent
that it is consciously controlled, is a product of the familiar, rather than
the strange. Hence, the theatergoer may desist from going to a play be-
cause he dislikes G. B. Shaw, rather than because unbeknown to him an
enemy will be lurking in the audience. And again, the fact that a longlost
friend, instead of an enemy, was to be in the audience, information of which
he is ignorant, will not change his mind. This homely illustration suggests
that our th'eatergoer will act in response to information with which he is
acquainted. Perhaps he would act differently if he knew more; but he is
impervious to other facts. The analogy extends to the mental processes of
the Justice, when voting on a mddleground case. If he had the historical,
political and economical insight required to appraise the national impor-
tance or unimportance of a case, he might well come to one conclusion. But
since he does not, he is forced to suspend judgment or be arbitrary. 9 ' Since
he has something familiar upon which to grasp, he can well afford to sus-
pend judgment on the "importance" issue. The Justice's training in the law
is responsible for the familiarity that I suggest. Because of his qualifica-
tions for things legal, he need neither act arbitrarily nor completely sus-
pend judgment. A cursory examination of a given decision seldom leaves a
scholar of law without at least a tentative opinion as to its legal merits or
demerits. Just as the theatergoer refuses to go to a play because of his
previous acquaintance with Shavian wit, rather than a consideration of
the -contents of the audience, the Justice denies certiorari because of his
previous acquaintance with legal problems, rather than a consideration of
historical-political-economical considerations, with which he is compara-
tively unfamiliar.
An examination of the cases lends some support to this analogy, al-
though the "doctrine of secrecy" rather clouds the vista. Recorded dissents
without opinion to denials of certiorari in "middleground cases" curiously
197 One can hardly dispute that in a "middleground case," where all other considerations
are not enlightening, the Justice's decision must have been influenced to some degree by his
tentative opinion of the correctness or erroneousness of the decision below. The question, how-
ever, is how much this tentative opinion influences the justice.
198 1 speak only of the "middleground case."
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seem to reflect characteristic dissatisfaction with the merits of the decision
below, revealed by the same justices in opinions respecting similar cases
where review was granted. The occasional dissenting opinion to a denial
of certiorari is frequently even more valuable in indicating that at least the
dissenting Justices were controlled by their belief in the incorrectness of
the decision below In the Agoston case.99 Justices Douglas and Black dis-
sented to the denial, claiming the decision below to be contrary to earlier
Supreme Court decisions; but the contention of such a conflict was mani-
festly unfounded. 200 Hence, Justices Black and Douglas did not mean that
the A goston case was in conflict with the other cases. Rather they had voted
to grant certiorari because they thought the Pennsylvania Court's rejec-
tion of the "per se doctrine" wrong, and hoped to convince the rest of the
Supreme Court to reverse on the merits.
A problem related to when certiorari should be granted reveals the
great influence of the justices' views on the merits of the decision below
I refer to the problem of the scope of review once certiorari has been
granted. Like the considerations relating to voting on certiorari, it is tradi-
tionally stated that no consideration will be given to claims of improper
findings of fact."-' Mr. Justice Frankfurter has been a leading exponent of
this view 2" But even he violated his own cardinal rule for no other reason
apparently, than his belief that the holding below was erroneous."
Another phenomenon that seems to support the premise in question is
the usual granting of certiorari in "conflict cases," particularly those of the
mddleground variety In addition to the Supreme Court's desire to retain
an orderly court system, such practice can be explained as an application
of the "tentative examination theory" When two cases conflict, obviously
199 See note 195 supra.
209 See page 164 of the text.
201 "The same considerations that should lead us to leave undisturbed, by denying cer-
tioran, decisions of the Courts of Appeals involving solely a fair assessment of a record on the
issue of unsubstantiality (i.e., of the evidence), ought to lead us to do no more than decide that
there was such a fair assessment when the case is here, as this is, on other legal issues." N.L.R.B.
v. Pittsburgh Steamship, 340 U.S. 498, 502 (1951).
202 Leviton v. United States, 343 U.S. 946 (1952).
203 Standard Oil v. United States, 340 U.S. 54, 61ff (1950). In that case the meaning of
"all consequences of warlike operation," a common provision in war risk insurance policies,
was being litigated. The Second Circuit had rejected the English rule that the showing of actual
causation is alone sufficient to render the insurer liable; rather the damage must also be shown
to be a proximate cause of warlike operations. 178 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1949) The Court of Ap-
peals also found that in fact there was no proximate cause, a finding generally considered to be
a finding of fact. Six Justices conclusively rejected the English rule, and affirmed, following
the usual practice of not going into the questions of fact. Justice Douglas dissented, advocating
the English rule. But Justices Jackson and Frankfurter dissented, going into the question of
whether or not the facts manifested proximate cause or not, and concluding that proximate
cause was present.
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one is erroneous, either the one up for immediate review or the case with
which it conflicts. Hence, the situation is a natural for the Supreme Court
to grant certiorari and clear up an error put forth by one or more inferior
courts.
Occasionally language in the opinions intimates that a consideration
of the merits was the factor controlling a vote by the writing Justices, re-
specting the disposition of the certiorari petition.2 °4
The Supreme Court's treatment of two recent cases certainly seems to
give substance to the "tentative examination theory." Both involved the
meaning of "taking" under the Fifth Amendment, as a basis for a just com-
pensation claim. Aleutian Livestock v. United States °5 was an action in
the Court of Claims 08 for the fair price of more than six thousand sheep
that had perished on the island of Umnak in the Aleutians. The United
States military authorities, when the Japanese had occupied Attu and other
nearby islands, had ordered evacuation of all civilian personnel on Umnak,
in order to expedite military operations. As a result of the evacuation, the
untended sheep died of starvation and other avoidable causes. The Court
of Claims denied relief, stating that the Fifth Amendment's provisions did
not apply when the property loss was the result of emergency military oper-
ations and the government did not actually use the property involved. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari °7
The second case is the Caltex case.20 Here, the retreating American
Army in the Philippines destroyed the claimant's oil production and refin-
ing property, to prevent it from falling into Japanese hands. The Court of
Claims permitted recovery in this case. The United States petitioned for
certiorari. The big question was whether certiorari would be granted in
light of the denial in the Aleutian case. Clearly there was no conflict of
decision, since both cases came up from the same court. It could not be
said that Caltex was an "importance" case, while the Aleutian case was
not; both cases raised substantially the same issues.20 The Supreme Court
did grant certiorari in the Caltex case 10 If the Court would affirm the de-
204 justice Reed apparently sees little distinction between an express affirmance of the
decision below and a denial of certiorari. In Stembndge v. Georgia, 343 U.S. 541, 548 (1952),
involving a dismissal of certiorari improvidently granted, he said m a concurring opinion,
"While I think the better course would be to affirm the decision of the Georgia courts, I join
in the judgment of this Court."
205 96 F.Supp. 626 (1951).
206 The same considerations applying to certiorari to other courts of general jurisdiction
also apply to certiorari to the Court of Claims. Rule 41.3.
207342 U.S. 875 (1951).
2 0 Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. United States, 100 F.Supp. 970 (1951).
2 09 The sheep company so contended in their petition for rehearing, which was demed m
342 U.S. 907 (1952).
210 343 U.S. 955 (1952).
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cision, little could be said in defense of the same Court's refusal to review
the Aleutian case. But the Court reversed Caltex,1 ' apparently for those
reasons articulated by the Court of Claims in its Aleutian case opinion.
How can the treatment of the.two certiorari petitions be reconciled?212
The most visible distinction is that the Aleutian decision was right, and the
Caltex decision was wrong From the tenor of the certiorari documents in
both cases and the decisions of the Court of claims, as well as the Supreme
Court opinion, it could not be said that the Aleutian case was obviously
correct, while the Caltex case was obviously wrong. Hence, the two cases
can be labelled as "middleground." I submit that the Aleutian case was
thought to be "tentatively correct," while the Caltex case was considered
to be "tentatively erroneous." The net effect was a demal of certiorari in
the former and granting in the latter.
2 1 3
I. The Dragnosis and Cure: A Summary
The mental processes of the Justices upon examining a petition for cer-
tiorari in substance involve the answering of four questions.
(1) Is there a formal or jurisdictional defect?
(2) Is the granting of the writ tactically advisable?
(3) Is this an "obviously important" or "obviously unimportant" case?
(4) Is the decision below "tentatively correct" or "tentatively erro-
neous"?
Affirmatively answering any of the first three questions disposes of the
petition. If all three are answered in the negative, the Justices must utilize
the "tentative examination" procedure to answer the last question.
211344 U.S. 149 (1952)
212 Few would rationally contend that the Supreme Court favors government petitioners,
rather than private ones. It has, however, been observed that the percentage of government
petitions for certiorari granted far exceed that of the non-governmental petitions. 95 CO'nG.
REc. A4943ff (1949) This condition has variously been attributed to the competence of the
government petition-writers, the discretion of the Justice department in selecting the cases for
which certiorari will be applied, and the high correlation of government cases with the quality
of "importance." I suspect all of these are factors. But one additional reason might be recog-
nized. The various legal staffs of the government undoubtedly have less of the predatory-
adversary instinct, and more of the desire to reach a just result, than private counsel. The
result is that the government will settle for an apparently correct though adverse decision below,
while it will certainly petition for certiorari if the decision below is apparently wrong. This
again suggests that the Supreme Court is likely to grant certiorari, where the holdings below
are apparently incorrect.
213 One other, though I think illusory, explanation may be suggested. The Government in
the Aleutian case only indirectly caused the loss; that is, the army did not slaughter the sheep
directly In Caltex army personnel actually set off the dynamite. If such a distinction can be
made, the Caltex facts are the strongest ones for the claimant. Hence, a holding for the Gov-
ernment in the Caltex situation would be the a fortion case; while a holding for the Govern-
ment in the Aleutian case would conceivably have been distinguishable from the Caltcx facts.
Perhaps the Supreme Court, through tactical considerations, was waiting for the better case.
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An apparent vulnerability to a theory of "tentative examination" is that
of time consumption in so appraising the merits of the holding below. I
submit that the word "tentative" dispels any such objection. As I have
mentioned before, the word "tentative" connotes flexibility and temporari-
ness; but it also implies brevity. And it is not implausible that a Justice
can come to a tentative conclusion after only a brief examination of the
merits of the holding below The law school examination has served to
instill this faculty in the American Bar.2 '
Various factors influence just how much time is to be given to the "ten-
tative examination" of a specific case.215 Probably the fact that there were
a comparatively large number of hearings on the merits below, all of which
held one way, would tend to minimize the length of the examination. Per-
haps the quality of the court immediately below might be another factor.
Certainly more time must be given to a case complex in law and/or fact,
than one with simple facts and well defined issues.
But why has not the "tentative examination" process been articulated?
The "doctrine of secrecy" would largely account for the lack of publicity
relating to specific cases. The "non-merit fnyth" seems to be responsible
for little mention of the process in the multitude of general statements by
the Justices.
In the light of this analysis, it would seem desirable that petitioners and
respondents should draft their petitions and briefs with the "tentative ex-
amination" in mind. However, I do not recommend that a petition or oppos-
ing brief resemble briefs on the merits. In appreciation of the formal pre-
requisites and time consumption, only the substantive highlights should be
hit; recognition of such a practice is particularly necessary in the complex
case. But procedural and substantive technique"' in drafting these docu-
214 Justice Frankfurter has recognized this quality of the tentative examination. Darr v.
Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 238 (1950).
215 A number of current articles have criticized the Supreme Court for lightening its work-
load. One explanation might be that the Justices have decided to make the tentative examina-
tion more thorough than had previously been done. If this explanation be valid, the Court now
more carefully decides a great number of cases each term, rather than restricts itself to a few
more full dress reviews. And, under this theory, it is not surprising that more grantings of
certiorari do not result, since experience shows that the bulk of decisions of Courts of Appeals
and highest state courts are correct. Hearings before Committee on Judicnary on H.R. 8206,
68th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1924), also in 81 CONG. Rc. 3325 (1937). The only effect of this
suggested new certioran policy- would be that more deserving cases are reviewed on certiorari.
Dean Green of Northwestern Law School has suggested that a fulltime committee of
Justices should be devoted to ruling only on petitions for certiorari. Hearings before Committee
on Judiciary on S.1392, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 258 (1937). Thus, in a manner reminiscent of
the now defunct French Chambre des Requltes, thoroughness could be accomplished, without
the handicap of additional time consumption.
216 At present not only are vast numbers of petitions deficient in techmque, but apparently
many of them are critically incomplete in their coverage of the merits. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 493 (1953).
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ments can only reach their optimum, when the United States Supreme
Court overtly abandons the "doctrine of secrecy 1217
I hope I have been persuasive that an efficient and intelligible certiorari
procedure is possible. All that is necessary is the frank cooperation of the
Justices and a greater degree of conscientiousness by the practitioner on
petitions for certiorari.218
21
7 A renunciation of the "non-merit myth" by the Court would also seem to be necessary.
In a speech given before the American Bar Association in 1949, Chief Justice Vinson said:
"Lawyers might be well advised, in preparing petitions for certiorari to spend a little less time
discussing the merits of their cases and a little more time demonstrating why it is important
that the Court should hear them If it (the petition) only succeeds in demonstrating that
the decision below may be erroneous, it has not fulfilled its purpose." ST. Louis DAmY REcoRD,
p. 6 , column I (Sept. 8, 1949). Though the Chief Justice was apparently not contemplating the
"mddleground case," such unclarified statements by the Justices can only be obstacles to the
filing of model petitions and briefs.
218 See Hughes, Address at ALI Meetting, 20 A.B.A.J. 341 (1934).
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